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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

MOROCCO

PART 4

January to December 1950

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING MOROCCO—PART 4

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

JF 1017/2

No. 1

WINTER SESSION OF THE CONSEIL DU GOUVERNEMENT IN FRENCH MOROCCO

Consul-General, Sir C. Cane to Mr. Bevin. (*Received* 11*th January*, 1950)

(No. 39) *Rabat,*
Sir, 29*th December*, 1949.

I have the honour to report that the Conseil du Gouvernement opened its winter session on 12th December. The main object of this session was to discuss the budget, which has been in preparation for some weeks past and is now submitted for approval.

This procedure followed by session differed little from its predecessors. It opened with everyone on their best behaviour and in general agreement to conduct themselves quietly and calmly, but the atmosphere soon gets heated, tempers are lost, fists are shaken and acrimonious words are passed. This would be all right if anything was really achieved as a result of these alleged debates, but it all boils down to a certain airing of grievances by those few who have the country's interests at heart, a baiting of the heads of various Departments, notably that of Public Works and at the end the Conseil agree to everything put up by the Administration. "Plus ça change plus c'est la même chose" might be the watchword.

The main interest to outsiders on these occasions is the speeches made by the Resident-General on the occasion of the opening and closure of the sessions. His opening speech this time contained the usual review of the work achieved by the French Administration throughout the past year and of the benefits accruing therefrom. "The constant preoccupation of the Administration" said General Juin "was to ameliorate the lot of the inhabitants of the country, but this is inextricably bound up with the potential economy of the country and every effort must be made to improve this."

His speech also contained two points of considerable interest. "Conditions of this life have shown a marked change. The time for individual small States is past. The only hope for civilisation lies in the organisation of unions of nations having common interests. Geography is now the ruler. Morocco is more closely tied to Western Europe and the Mediterranean than to its own continent, separated as it is from it by large expanses of desert wastes. In this Western Group Morocco can only wield such strength and authority as she herself can bring into it. This would be small were it only a question of geography, but if she offers herself in full strength and with the knowledge of the advantage that solidarity confers with all its potential wealth, she will have in her own hands the most sure guarantee of her future greatness and liberty." These are high sounding words, but it will not have escaped notice that Morocco's future greatness and liberty would appear to be solely in her being bound to Western Europe, *i.e.*, France.

The second point made by General Juin was "The problems facing the régime to-day of imports without exchange restrictions and the future problems set by the liberation of exchange and the necessity for allowing Moroccan agriculture and industry to develop normally must make us look facts in the face. Whatever may have been the advantages in the past of an International Act (the Treaty of Algeciras is clearly meant here) which corresponded to a certain epoch and state of the Cheriffian Empire; it is possible to demand to-day if this country can be left isolated and defenceless before a world, certainly paved with good intentions, but who only look upon freedom of exchange behind the shelter of comfortable customs barriers. This is a future on which one must ponder now."

The closing words of this opening speech which contained the usual admonition for the tightening of the bonds between the French and Moroccan members of the Conseil contained the phrase "In a country where to govern is to construct." This has been eagerly seized upon by the press and all sections of the populace who have taken

the word "construct" in its literal sense; the housing situation remaining as big a problem as ever.

The French session then settled down to work. The first day was given up to hearing the report of the Director of Finance and a general discussion of the budget proposals. The following day the question of the cost and size of the Administration staffs and the functions of the *Paysannat* were debated. This last Department was originally formed in order to protect the interests of the peasants but is now accused of widening its scope, but without performing its original duties. The proposal to reduce the vote for the Department by 100 million and to attach this Department to that of Agriculture produced a good deal of heated argument. The question of the staff of the Administration also caused much argument, and there were many demands for the reduction of officials generally. However, in the course of the debate, General Juin stated that there were less than there should be!

On subsequent days the Conseil tackled the budgets of the Finance Department and Public Works. The last Department was fiercely criticised for lack of energy and imagination. M. Girard, the director, however, refused to be ruffled and survived as usual. The final day (17th December) was devoted to an examination of the budgets for the Department of Labour and Social Services and the Department of Agriculture. The excitement of the previous days had by this time died down and the business was wound up in a calmer atmosphere.

At the end of the session the President read to the Resident-General a motion which had been unanimously agreed upon. The chief points of this were:—

(*a*) A declaration of faith in the Resident-Général.
(*b*) A confirmation of the Budget Commission's wise policy.
(*c*) A demand to the State to keep its expense within the limits of its receipts and to avoid any unnecessary charges.
(*d*) A note of the Government's promise not to have recourse to the collective except in the gravest emergency.
(*e*) Every effort should be made to reduce the cost of living.
(*f*) Every effort should be made to overcome the housing problem especially for those with modest incomes.
(*g*) Affirmation of the necessity for pursuing social reforms in all its phases.
(*h*) A demand for an economic policy based on increasing production and export.
(*i*) A recognition of the importance of agriculture.
(*j*) An expression of confidence in the wisdom of General Juin who will, by means of order and social security, adopt those reforms which are necessary to secure the financial stability and social and economic expansion of Morocco under French protection.

After thanking the members for their interest in the debates and for the above motion, General Juin said: "You are well aware of the difficulties which I come up against in my work. Some, but not many, originate in this country. The greater number, however, come in part from our own country and often from the outside which in these days embraces a wide horizon. These difficulties, born from ignorance and incomprehension, except when they are not deliberately engineered, serve through a lack of confidence. In any case the strength of all of us here in this Council and in the Government itself lies in the faith, which we shall always keep alight, we have in this country and ourselves.

The Moroccan session of the Conseil commenced its work on 19th December. The session was opened by a tribute paid by the Resident-General to the late Pasha of Casablanca who died recently. The same speech as that made at the opening of the French session was then read to the Moroccan members.

Proceedings of the first day were confined to the reading and debate of the General Report by M. Zarrouck, *Rapporteur Général*, who described his report as "a modest work in which financial technicalities were replaced by good faith." The following days were given up to the discussion of the rôle played by the *Paysannat* and the protection of the "fellahs" and the budgets for the Departments of Health and of Labour. In connexion with the latter, the question of the eventual creation of a Moroccan trades union was discussed. General Juin said that the right for a trades union was a legitimate one, and a decree on this question, had already been submitted to the Sultan for approval Unfortunately, His Majesty's views and those of the Residency-General did not coincide. The Resident-General considered that the Moroccans had not sufficient experience in such matters and that any such movement should be affiliated to a European trade union. The Sultan insisted that the movement should be surely Moroccan. For this reason it would be better that this question should not be raised at this meeting.

Not unnaturally the two sessions approach their work from different view points. That of the French being mainly confined to interest in political and economic questions, whilst the Moroccan interest is mainly centred in social questions. For these reasons the debate on the budget for the Department of Public Instruction shattered the usual calm and dignity with which the Moroccan session usually conducts its affairs and the atmosphere of the Chamber at times almost resembled a French meeting.

Great stress was laid by delegates not only upon the need for more schools, but that Arabic should be the primary language taught in them. The creation of a Moroccan school to be entirely indigenous in its curriculum and whose diplomas will have the same value as French diplomas was demanded. The substitution of French for Arabic in schools was deplored. Arabic was the true language of the country, and the youth of the country should be taught this first. In reply to a demand for a Superior Council of Teaching in reply to a demand for a Superior Council of Teaching in which all those delegates who are interested may take part, the Director of Education said that this would be difficult, but the question would be carefully studied.

At the next meeting when the budget for Public Works was discussed things were normal again although Moroccan interest in the work covered by this department is considerable since housing, roads, ports and railways to mention just a few items being of as much interest to the Moroccans as to the French.

The last meeting was held on 24th December, and given up to discussions on budgets for the Departments of Agriculture and of Trade and produced nothing remarkable.

In his closing speech General Juin expressed his satisfaction at the progress made in the past two years by the members of the Moroccan session, who, he said, clearly understood the importance of these debates and brought them up to the high level consonant with the importance of the occasion. He then said that he wished once and for all to correct any misunderstanding that might have arisen through a mal-interpretation of certain remarks passed in recent speeches. There was only one ruler of Morocco and that was His Majesty the Sultan. There was, however, a treaty existing between France and Morocco, and the general outlined the essential point; which was the establishment of a new régime in which certain necessary reforms (administrative, juridical, &c.) would be carried out. The measures in connexion with this are decreed, on French proposals, by the Sultan or his representatives. France had adhered faithfully to this charter. After then touching briefly on France's work in the past and exhorting the members to be on their guard against subversive propaganda, General Juin concluded: "Believe me, we have never doubted the wisdom of the Moroccan upper classes. We have confidence in you. We know that you wish to work in harmony and concord. Only by this means can you lead this country, under the protection of the Sultan, to its glorious destiny."

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and Cairo, His Majesty's Consuls-General at Tangier, Tunis, Algiers and Tetuan and His Majesty's Consuls at Casablanca and Fez.

I have, &c.
CYRIL H. CANE.

JM 1011/1

No. 2

TANGIER: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1949

Consul-General Stirling to Mr. Bevin. (*Received* 14*th January*)

(No. 1. Confidential) *Tangier,*
Sir, *5th January*, 1950.

I have the honour to transmit herewith my report on events in Tangier during the year 1949.

I have, &c.
C. N. STIRLING.

Enclosure in No. 2

Report on events in Tangier during 1949

Political

There has been no great change in the political situation at Tangier during the

year. The provisional régime set up in 1945 has lasted for 4 years and the expectation that a conference will be held to revise the Statute within a short time has become somewhat dulled. Even the agitation for revision which the Spaniards have conducted ever since the International Administration was restored seems to have been damped down, at least temporarily. Possibly the Spanish Government feel that they have more important things to do than to quarrel with the Powers over Tangier at the present time. Possibly also they are influenced by their financial difficulties. For instance they have recently withdrawn the Naval and Air Attachés whom they had previously maintained here, while work on the new Spanish Consulate has progressed very slowly. The fact that the ambitious and influential Spanish Consul-General himself has been ill for a great part of the year may also have spoken for a less active policy.

This is not to say that the Spanish Government may not renew the pressure at any moment. They certainly still resent the fact that they are not better represented in the International Administration and they have many ways of making its existence difficult. At one time it looked as though they intended to make use for this purpose of the frontier dispute which they had started in 1946. In March the authorities of the Spanish Protectorate demanded that the Administration should stop repairing a stretch of the Tetuna road on the Tangier side of the present frontier station on the ground that it lay within the area to which the Spaniards have laid claim. This piece of provocation seems, however, to have originated with the local authorities rather than with the Spanish Government. The Spanish Consul-General was persuaded to intervene at Tetuan and nothing more was heard of it. In September there was a further incident when the Spanish police took it on themselves to place boundary stones some way inside the traditional frontier of the zone, but this was settled by agreement between the head of the Tangier police and the Spanish Military Attaché. The Boundary Commission set up in 1948 has been inactive, the Spaniards having failed to reply to the last communication from the Belgian Consul-General. But when it was suggested to them that the Commission should adjourn *sine die* the authorities at Tetuan suggested that further discussions might lead to a solution. These are still pending.

No change has taken place in the principal posts of the Administration, but certain minor appointments will have to be made shortly. The French authorities have made it fairly clear that they will try to maintain the preponderant position which they hold in the higher ranks of the Civil Service, the Spaniards will, no doubt, press their claims and the Italian Consul-General has indicated discreetly that he would be glad to see his country's position recognised by the allocation of at least a secondary post. In general, however, M. Baldoni has showed himself reasonable and accommodating and has co-operated unobtrusively in the Committee of Control.

It is fairly clear that the United States Government are taking an increasing interest in Tangier. For instance, the State Department have agreed that their Minister, who is usually careful to remember that his Government have not acceded to the Statute, should act as President of the Committee of Control during the coming year. This attitude is probably connected with the strategic interest of the American Government in the North-west corner of Africa as a whole, with the United States air base at Port Lyautey, with the two American commercial wireless stations already in existence in the International Zone and with the erection of a new station here to re-transmit " The Voice of America." The influx of contractors' staff to work on " The Voice of America " station and the arrival of naval officers to supervise, the contract has given rise to rumours that it is to be used as camouflage for military preparations of some kind. As far as can be seen, however, these are unfounded.

The Portuguese Consul-General presided over the Committee of Control during the year with considerable skill. Naturally energetic and efficient he was clearly determined to make his year of office a success. As Portuguese representative, he shows some sympathy in private with the Spanish point of view, but as chairman his object was always to ensure the smooth working of the Committee and he persistently side-tracked any discussions between the French and the Spaniards, which might have led to friction.

Administration

A competition was held early in the year to choose an architect to prepare a town plan for Tangier. This aroused the usual international jealousies and it was eventually decided that the winning architects (of French, Spanish and Italian nationality respectively) should concert together and share the work between them. As a result the introduction of the very necessary control of development has been further retarded.

Relations between the Administration and the concessionary companies which supply electricity and water to the town have become critical. The supply of electricity broke down completely during the summer owing to the drying up of the reservoir in the Spanish Zone which provides hydro-electric energy, and to the failure of the company to provide a reasonable reserve of thermal capacity. The Administration have engaged Messrs. Kennedy and Donkin of London to prepare a report on the situation. The water supply has greatly improved as a result of the sinking of new wells by the Administration, who have given notice to re-purchase the concession, as they are entitled to do, at the end of the year. The position with regard to both concessions has been complicated by arbitral awards signed by the Assistant Administrator for Finance as the Administrator's arbitrator agreeing to the revaluation of both companies' capital to the considerable prejudice of the Zone. The Administrator has notified the companies that he considers the arbitrations invalid and legal action is pending.

The British-owned bus company having asked to abandon its concession owing to a difference with the Administration over fares, a new concession has been given to a Portuguese company which is to start operating in the new year.

The Administration have employed Mr. Richard Graves, formerly Director of the Labour Department in the Palestine Government, to advise them on labour legislation for the zone.

On the initiative of the Administration a charitable association has been formed of representatives of all the principal communities to help to combat tuberculosis in the zone. The Administration themselves have opened a dispensary staffed by two doctors working half time for the same purpose.

Nationalism

During the early part of the year there was little activity among the Nationalists in Tangier. Both Abdelkhalek Torres and Allal el Fassi appeared to be content to live quietly on the funds subscribed by their followers, while Mekki Nasiri's main preoccupation was the debut of his newspaper *Minbar-Chaab* (The Tribune of the People), the first mention of which appeared in July.

Nasiri seems to have come to an understanding with the French authorities in Rabat who helped him with newsprint and in other ways, and his paper, which is very moderate in tone, has proved disappointing to the Nationalists who expected something on the lines of his previous organ, *La Voix du Maroc*."

Nasiri's party, " The Moroccan Unity Party " has undoubtedly lost ground in the last two years and his new venture in journalism has done nothing to restore his diminishing prestige. Moreover, the assistance given him by the French has caused him to be viewed with suspicion and distrust by the other Nationalist groups.

Allal el Fassi has throughout the year given a series of sermons in the Mosque. Although these are alleged to be completely non-political, a certain amount of nationalist propaganda is camouflaged under the cloak of religion.

The arrest and interrogation of a large number of Moors in the Spanish Zone during the summer, the exact reason of which was never disclosed by the Spanish authorities, had certain repercussions in Tangier. A number of Moors managed to escape to the International Zone where their accounts of the methods employed by the Spaniards aroused great indignation in Nationalist circles and Torres sent a letter of protest to the Spanish High Commissioner at Tetuan.

It was left, however, mainly to the Shereef Darkaoua, the rather unscrupulous head of a religious sect which has followers throughout Morocco, to voice the general resentment, which he did in no uncertain terms, since many of his followers had been beaten up and thrown into prison. His sermons in the mosque were devoted for some time to bitter attacks on the activities in Tetuan. While the Shereef's indignation was probably genuine there seems to be little doubt that he also hoped to blackmail the Spanish into buying his silence as they have done in the past. It is understood that he was warned by the French authorities, who also subsidise him, that they would not countenance any attempt to stir up trouble in the Spanish Zone, and he went off in September on a pilgrimage to Mecca in an aeroplane chartered by the French.

The Nationalist camp in general shows no more signs of unity than it has done in the past and until the leaders of the three parties represented in Tangier are prepared to sink their personal jealousies and work together for a common cause it is unlikely that they will constitute a real danger to the protecting powers in the French or Spanish Zones, much less to the International Administration in Tangier.

The long awaited marriage between the Khalifa of the Spanish Zone and Lalla Fatima, daughter of the ex-Sultan, Abdul Aziz, who had previously lived in Tangier, finally took place in Tetuan at the end of June.

Communism

For a year or two after the restoration of the International Administration the Communist Parties in Tangier were fairly open in distributing propaganda and collecting funds.

House searches by the police and the expulsion of 3 or 4 members of the Spanish Communist Party have had the result of sending them more or less underground again and the printing of a local edition of *Mundo Obrero*, the organ of the Spanish Communist Party, was discontinued early in 1949.

It is understood that the Spanish Communist Party is making some effort to recruit young members by penetration of the local football clubs, but it appears to lack trained leaders.

The local branch of the Moroccan Communist Party (Parti Communiste Marocain), which is directed by an employee of the International Administration, is reported to be on bad terms with the Spanish Communist Party. Whereas in the past Spaniards were free to join the P.C.M. and *vice versa*, now Spanish Communists are forced to join the P.C.E., while all others are directed to join the P.C.M.

The title "Moroccan Communist Party" is a misnomer, as few of the members are Moors and the ring-leaders are either French functionaries or Algerians.

There is little evidence of any direct Russian influence in Tangier, but one of the members of the Central Committee of the Moroccan Communist Party is said to be in possession of a Soviet passport.

As far as can be ascertained the Nationalists continue to refuse all Communist offers of collaboration.

Zionism

With the recognition of Israel by the Powers, the question of Jewish emigration became one of some importance at Tangier.

During the first half of 1949 a great deal of Zionist propaganda was disseminated, particularly in French Morocco, and a number of Jews left for transit camps at Marseilles. Some of them came from Tangier and more passed through. The authorities went to some pains to keep these departures quiet as it was feared that the Moors might show considerable resentment at the free exit of Moroccan Jews whereas no exit permits had been issued to Moors volunteering to fight in Palestine.

After a time the Mendoub refused to grant exit visas for France to Moroccan Jews who were suspected of intending to proceed to Israel. The majority of the Jewish emigrants were unskilled indigents who proved to be quite unsuited to life in Israel and many of them returned to Tangier completely disillusioned with conditions in Israel.

Instructions from the Israeli Government have now been received by the Zionists here saying that future emigrants are to be selected as far as possible from young skilled workmen.

The Mixed Tribunal

Judge M. H. Rafferty tendered his resignation early in the year to take effect from 1st November, and His Majesty's Government nominated Judge E. S. Lemass of the Mixed Court of Appeal at Alexandria to take his place. Judge Lemass did not in fact take the oath until 20th December owing to delay in the issuing of the necessary letter of appointment by the Sultan.

The status of the Tribunal has been brought into question indirectly by a dispute which has arisen over a question of jurisdiction. There is no provision in the law of Tangier for settling conflicts of jurisdiction between the Mixed Tribunal and the Shereefian Courts, and this fact has been made use of in two cases during the year affecting the civil status of Moroccan Jews who have at some time been nationalised by foreign countries. The dispute has been taken up with surprising vehemence by the French and Spanish authorities, the French upholding the jurisdiction of the Shereefian Courts on the ground that a Moroccan subject cannot divest himself of his nationality without the authority of the Sultan, while the Spaniards support the claims of the Mixed Tribunal which has declared itself competent in both cases. The French claim that the judgments of the Mixed Courts were influenced by prejudice on the part of the Spanish President of the Appeal Section and the French Consul-General has put forward a tentative suggestion that the Tribunal should be reformed; but discussion of this vexed question has so far been postponed by the Committee of Control.

Trade

In spite of some talk of a business recession early in the year, statistics for the first nine months show no falling off in the movement of trade. Imports into Tangier during this period amounted to 6,542 million francs, nearly 1,000 million francs more than last year, and exports to 720 million francs, about the same as in 1948. Of these totals the United Kingdom's share was: imports, 466,578,000 francs; exports, 7,251,000 francs, a decrease in imports and an increase in exports since the corresponding period of 1948.

There are some signs, however, which indicate that the boom which was in full swing in 1948 may have passed its height. The Administration attribute the continued high level of imports largely to the importation of goods for the building industry, and the fact that rents of new premises are getting a little easier suggests that, when the 18 or so large buildings now in process of erection are completed, there may be a falling off in construction work. Moreover, the improvement of the French financial situation is believed to have led to the return of a certain amount of "hot money" to France and this may diminish the funds available for speculative development.

Exchange Rates.—The devaluation of sterling had little or no effect on the Tangier exchange market where the most notable movement during the year has been the improvement of the franc. At the end of December 1948 the franc stood at 1883 to the £, whereas the present rate is about 1090. The rate of the peseta against sterling has fluctuated between 135 and 115, but for the most part has remained fairly stable at about 124 to the £. The dollar value of the £ moved from $3·20 to $2.70 just after devaluation, but later improved to a little over par. The rate sagged during December, and on 30th December stood at $2·65.

Finance

There was some criticism early in the year of certain transactions in connexion with the reserves of the zone. These reserves have by law to be kept in Moroccan francs, but in 1948, in view of the weakness of the franc, the Assembly authorised the transfer of a part of the reserves into gold or dollars. The Director of Finance astutely made use of this authority to the material advantage of the zone by buying gold at the official rate from the Bank for International Settlements and selling it at a profit on the free market. Not unnaturally, however, he was reluctant to disclose details of the transactions even to the Legislative Assembly. This led to some friction between himself and the Finance Commission and eventually the Assembly, considering that such dealings were likely to bring the zone into discredit, decided not to authorise any further transactions. Details of M. Cracco's operations have still not been disclosed, but the reserves of the zone were written up by 200 million francs in July.

In March the Legislative Assembly authorised in principle the issue of a loan of 4 million dollars for public works to be carried out in the zone. At a later meeting they gave tentative approval to a list of works to be financed out of the loan, of which the principal were the improvement of the harbour works to prevent the silting up of the port, and the purchase and development of land for cheap housing. No steps have so far been taken to issue the loan. The full programme of public works to be carried out on capital account in 1950 has not yet been submitted to the Legislative Assembly, and the Administration naturally do not wish to raise the loan until they need the money. Steps have been taken to expropriate the land for the housing project, but the preliminary payments are being financed by advances from the Treasury and the authorities have power to borrow on short term up to 500 million francs.

The budget receipts, three-quarters of which are derived from the Customs, have been well maintained and at the end of September the Ordinary Receipts had already exceeded the estimate for the year of 970 million francs. Expenditure is difficult to estimate as the Public Works Department usually send in large accounts after the end of the year, but it is probable that there will be a substantial surplus over

the whole year in addition to the profit on exchange referred to above.

The Ordinary Budget for 1950 was passed by the Assembly on 14th December. It provides for revenue estimated at 999,681,000 francs and expenditure of 968,666,000 francs.

Port

The new passenger quay was completed and brought into use in August.

The President and the British Directors of the Port Company visited Tangier in April. They stated that from what they saw no great expansion of the trade of the port could be expected in the near future and that no major extension of the harbour works would be economically justified. Work has, however, been put in hand on improving the lighter harbour and the company have asked for tenders for a scale model of the port with a view to deciding on the steps to be taken to prevent silting.

Aviation

Air France and another French company, T.A.I.M., have each started a direct weekly service between Paris and Tangier.

The new airport building was completed and opened in February and the new road to the airport in the autumn.

Gibraltar Airways and some other users have begun to complain of the charges levied by Air France who own the airport.

Naval Visits

H.M. cruiser *Sirius* paid an informal visit to Tangier in February and a number of smaller British warships have visited the port during the year, mostly bringing leave parties from Gibraltar. An American squadron paid an official visit in September and a successful informal visit was paid by three Indian destroyers of the 11th Destroyer Flotilla later in the month.

Wireless

No new wireless stations have been opened in the International Zone during the year, but work is proceeding on "The Voice of America" station which is expected to be partially working early this year.

Contraband

Draft legislation designed to suppress smuggling out of Tangier was presented to the Legislative Assembly in September, but was rejected by them on the ground that the measures proposed would be damaging to the trade of the port.

JM 1192/1 No. 3

SPANISH REQUEST FOR THE EXTRADITION OF THE SHEREEF EL DARKAOUA

Mr. Consul-General Stirling to Mr. Bevin. (Received 10th February)

(No. 15. Confidential) *Tangier,*
Sir, *6th February, 1952.*

During the last few days various reports have been circulating in Tangier of the smuggling of arms over the frontier into the Spanish Zone and of an attack by a small band of armed men on a Spanish military post. Some of these reports implicated the Shereef el Darkaoua (please see paragraph 8 (Moslems) of the Personalities Report and the section on nationalism in my annual report for 1949) and one story alleged that he had received 6 million francs from the Communists as payment for fomenting trouble.

2. It is difficult to get to the bottom of these reports. They are numerous and fairly circumstantial, but, as is natural in the circumstances, most if not all of them come from Spanish sources, and the only evidence which would implicate the International Zone and the Shereef is contained in Spanish accounts of the alleged depositions of prisoners in their hands. The Spaniards seem in fact to have renewed the frontier precautions which they took at the time of the arrests referred to in despatches from Tetuan last summer, and it is probable that there is at least some substratum of fact behind the reports. It is not impossible that the Darkaoui, who is by all accounts prepared to do anything for money, and is in any case on bad terms with the Spaniards, may have taken payment to stir up trouble in the Spanish Zone. On the other hand, it is no less likely, as certain reports say, that the affair has been exaggerated by the High Commissioner or the Spanish military authorities in order to enhance their importance with the Government in Madrid, and

they would be only too ready to find an excuse for blaming the International Administration.

3. Last week my French colleague informed me that the Spanish Consul-General had written on General Varela's instructions to the Acting Mendoub demanding that the Darkaoui should be handed over to the Spanish authorities for judgment in the Spanish Zone and quoting in support Articles 3 and 10 of the Tangier Statute. Ahmed Tazi had replied (no doubt after consulting his French advisers) expressing his willingness to collaborate in maintaining order, but stating that all he could do under the articles of the statute quoted would be to issue an order of expulsion and that in any case he could not take action without full enquiry in view of the possible consequences. (By this he seems to have referred to the special position of the Darkaoui as a religious leader.)

4. On Saturday, 4th February, M. del Castillo rang up the American Minister, the chairman of the Committee of Control, and told him that the matter was becoming serious and that he must call an early meeting of the Committee. Mr. Plitt indicated his surprise at M. del Castillo's attitude in view of the fact that he had not thought fit to give him any previous information on the affair whatever. M. del Castillo subsequently sent him a written communication enclosing copies of his correspondence with M. Tazi and calling for an immediate decision by the committee on the alleged breaches of the statute. A meeting of the committee was held this morning to consider this letter. I had the advantage of discussing the matter with Sir Eric Beckett before the meeting and also spoke to Mr. Plitt and his legal adviser. In the course of yesterday M. del Castillo altered his communication and attached to it a copy of a warrant addressed by the Spanish Juge d'Instruction to the Procurator of the Mixed Tribunal calling for the arrest and delivery of the Darkaoui to the Spanish authorities. (Article 2 of the Franco-Spanish Agreement of 1916 (which is made applicable in the Zone under Article 48 of the statute) provides for the execution of warrants issued by the juridical authorities of one Zone in Morocco by the authorities of another Zone.)

5. At the meeting this morning the Spanish Minister supported his letter by one of his usual attacks on the police of the International Zone, attributing the alleged disturbances to the "situation confuse et faible de Tanger" and in addition gave a certain amount of detailed information based on the alleged statements of prisoners taken in the attack on the Spanish post, according to which they had received their instructions from the Darkaoui and their arms from caches in the Tangier Zone.

6. The committee agreed that the allegation of the smuggling of arms through Tangier was extremely serious and should be fully investigated, and the Administrator, who was present at the meeting, was instructed accordingly. Certain members expressed the hope that the Administration would receive every assistance from the Spanish police. I myself made a suggestion that a Spanish police officer should be sent over to assist in the enquiry and that the witnesses in the hands of the Spanish authorities should be brought over to be interrogated by the international police. The general sense of the meeting was that the Spanish authorities had made no serious attempt to co-operate with the police of the International Zone in this matter hitherto, and the Spanish Minister was left in no doubt of this. Complaints have been ventilated in the committee from time to time that Colonel Amado, the Spanish Military Attaché, who is the official Spanish liaison officer with the police, maintains no effective contact with them and gives them no information regarding the various anti-Spanish activities which his Minister alleges take place in the Zone.

7. When the question of contraband had been dealt with the general feeling of the meeting seemed to be in favour of closing the discussion without reference to the charges against the Darkaoui which, it was suggested, were now no concern of the committee, since the warrant for his extradition had been submitted to the tribunal who would have to take the decision. It is a fact that under the Franco-Spanish Agreement of 1916 warrants issued by a court in one of the three Zones of Morocco are automatically executable in the other Zones, and it would appear that if the Spanish warrant is in order the tribunal will have no alternative but to order the Darkaoui to be handed over to the Spanish authorities. There is, however, a provision in the agreement of 1916 that, if an individual whose extradition is demanded by one Zone is wanted on another charge by the Zone to whom the requisition is made, he shall not be handed over until that issue has been decided. I therefore suggested, in the light of my previous talk with Sir Eric Beckett, that, since the charges brought by the Spaniards against the Darkaoui referred

mainly to crimes alleged to have been committed in Tangier, the Administrator should be urged to set on foot an enquiry into the allegations, since in my view the Committee of Control could not disclaim responsibility in the light of the alleged breaches of the statute and of their general obligation to ensure the observance of its provisions under Article 30. The Administrator thereupon warned the committee that in his opinion any action taken against the Darkaoui might give rise to disturbances in the Zone, and he indicated to me privately that, if the Procurator called upon the international police to arrest the Darkaoui in order to hand him over to the Spaniards, he would refuse to take action without specific authority from the Committee of Control.

8. M. van Vredenburch has since informed me that the Spanish Minister has promised that the witnesses held in Tetuan will be handed over to the police here for interrogation. They will be questioned as to the places where arms are alleged to be hidden in the Zone. If they maintain the story they are alleged to have told to the Spaniards the Darkaoui's house will be searched, and if in general there seems to be adequate evidence against the Shereef a charge will probably be brought against him before the Mixed Tribunal. The question of handing him over to the Spaniards will, therefore, remain in suspense for the time being.

9. I should add that, according to M. van Vredenburch, the French Assistant Administrator has expressed the fear that the search of the Darkaoui's house may provoke riots among the Moslem population. M. van Vredenburch enquired whether I would be prepared to ask for one of His Majesty's ships to be sent over from Gibraltar for a few days, as not more than 200 of the international police could be counted on in the event of a religious outbreak.

10. The French officials here have shown themselves in the past to be rather unduly nervous of agitations among the native population, and I do not myself see any reason at present to ask for a warship.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar, to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid and to His Majesty's Consuls-General at Rabat and Tetuan.

I have, &c.

C. N. STIRLING.

No. 4

LABOUR UNREST IN FRENCH MOROCCO

Consul-General Cane to Mr. Bevin. (Received 27th February)

(1)

(No. 3) *Rabat,*
Sir, *10th February, 1950.*

I have the honour to report on a series of strikes which have recently broken out in French Morocco.

For some considerabe time past there has been much unrest among the workers due to the low wages, the increasing cost of living and the unsatisfactory allowances granted to meet this, and the fact that little or nothing has been done to ameliorate the housing conditions. Sporadic stoppages of work for periods of two to twenty-four hours have occurred in various industries or concerns with varying success from the point of view of the callers of the strikes. About a month ago a resolution was put up by the C.G.T. to the Administration on behalf of the State workers asking for a 25 per cent. increase in the monthly bonus of 3,000 fr., for the cost-of-living allowances to be raised to the same level as now prevailing in Paris and a reorganisation of the present grades of labour. There was also a clause demanding the right of the workers to freedom of expression and free trades unions.

This demand elicited no official response from the Administration who, however, let it be known generally that they could not accede to these demands since by doing so the Moroccan worker would be in a better position than his French counterpart. It was also considered that the inclusion of the last demands gave the question more of a political flavour than official circles could stomach.

On 23rd January therefore a strike of railway workers and dock labourers was called by the local branch of the C.G.T., despite opposition by the other labour affiliations the "Force Ouvrière" and the "Union des Syndicats Chrétiens des Cheminots du Maroc." This strike was intended to be of twenty-four hours duration only as in previous cases, but the response was larger than was expected, despite the opposition mentioned above, and at a meeting held in the late afternoon it was decided to prolong the strike a further twenty-four hours. This process was repeated daily until 5th February, when the workers suddenly decided to return to work the following day. In addition to this strike the electrical workers came out on 24th January and it is not certain whether they have all gone back yet.

The effect on the public of these strikes was very slight. After the first day or so, a certain number of trains were run and the supply of electric current was no worse than usual. Only in the ports were ships held up through lack of labour to load and unload and a certain amount of congestion occurred. The strike was by no means whole heartedly supported by the workers and one of the results was a pretty slanging match between the G.C.T. and the dissenting unions.

The attitude of the Administration towards this affair is a little difficult to understand. On the one hand, officials do not hesitate in private conversation to express their growing concern over the tendency to, and the number of strikes; on the other officially they seem to have sat back with compete complacency. There was an exception to this attitude, however, in the case of a strike, by the workers of COSUMA, which occurred at the same time. This company is a private concern on which I am reporting separately in my immediately following despatch. The Residency appear to have taken the attitude that the strike would collapse on economic grounds before it would be necessary to take any strong measures. I cannot but help think this is a foolish attitude to adopt because, although the workers have gone back without gaining any of their points, none the less they have given proof of a certain solidarity with the Communist-led C.G.T. and the fact that they have had to return without any gains is not likely to make for good relations between the worker and the State. Furthermore, it has given the Communist section of the unions a very good talking point.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris.

I have, &c.

CYRIL H. CANE.

(2)

Consul-General Cane to Mr. Bevin. (Received 27th February)

(No. 4) *Rabat.*
Sir, *10th February,* 1950.

In my immediately preceding despatch of to-day's date I had the honour to report on the strike of the railway workers, dock labourer and electrical workers.

Concurrent with this strike the employees of COSUMA (*Compagnie Sucrière Marocaine*), a private concern, also came out on strike on the advice of their own union leaders who acted doubtless at the behest of the C.G.T. They formulated the same demands as the other strikers.

This strike is of particular interest because none of the Europeans employed by the company struck, and of the Moroccans who came out all were reputed to be members of the *Istiqlal* Party. Again this strike was originally to last twenty-four hours only, but the management immediately dismissed eight of the ten leaders of the movement with the result that the workers decided to continue the struggle. In this case the Administration wasted no time and forty-eight hours after the beginning of the strike issued an arrêt requisitioning the factory and threatening with sanctions all those who did not report for work immediately. This did not, however, prevent an almost total stoppage of work, some 1,800 Moroccan workers out of a total of 2,000 being out. Efforts by the management to hire replacements were unsuccessful and as, despite their threats, the Administration did not proceed with sanctions the strike dragged on until 5th February, when it was announced that an increase of 4 francs per hour would be granted. The strikers thereupon decided to return to work the following day but still maintained their rights that their general claims should be favourably considered. So far the men who were dismissed have not been reinstated and consequently the union is at the moment without a head.

There is no doubt that, with the highest paid workers only receiving 15,000 francs per month and faced with the continual rising cost of living, the sugar workers have, like the bulk of the working classes in this country, good grounds for complaint. Their portion is not a happy one, they are

exploited and there is no such thing as collective bargaining. The *Patronat* which was set up with the purpose of protecting the workers seems to have forgotten its original purpose and little or no help can be obtained from it.

I have said above that this strike was of especial interest because all the Moroccan strikers were members of the *Istiqlal* Party. This fact has been eagerly seized upon by the diehard members of the Administration as a further proof that the Nationalists are flirting with the Communists. However the general consensus of outside opinion is against this theory. It cannot be forgotten that the French pursued the same policy in Indo-China when every Nationalist was *ipso facto* a Communist. Moreover the Sultan has definitely set his face against any idea of rapprochement with communism and the Sultan carries far more weight in Morocco than the French care to admit. None the less the campaign is going on and I enclose herein a copy of a manifesto issued by the *Istiqlal* Party commenting on the attitude of certain newspapers towards the strikers.

The position is dangerous. For some time past it has been known that the French are only waiting a pretext to jail or exile some of the Nationalist leaders on the grounds that they are too closely allied to communism. Such a move, however, would be likely to give rise to the most far-reaching and dangerous consequences to the French, and it is hoped that saner counsels will prevail. If they do not, there will be a strong possibility that, despite the Sultan's authority and influence, the more hot-headed Nationalists will do more than flirt with the Communists. The Resident-General's boast that there will always be order, and at any cost, while he is in the saddle may be very costly indeed.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris and His Majesty's Consul-General at Tangier.

I have, &c.

CYRIL H. CANE.

Enclosure in No. 4

Parti de l'Istiqlal Communiqué au sujet du Mouvement revendicatif des Travailleurs marocains

Les mouvements de grève qui se déroulent au Maroc, ont fourni l'occasion, à certains organes de presse, connus pour leurs attaches avec l'Administration et leurs idées réactionnaires, l'occasion d'une campagne d'affolement destinée à préparer ou à justifier des actes de violence à l'encontre d'une partie de la classe ouvrière de ce pays.

Le prétexte de cette campagne est le rapprochement, artificiellement établi par cette presse, entre ces mouvements et ceux déclenchés dans d'autres pays, dans un but, ajoute-t-on, essentiellement politique.

Les travailleurs marocains, a qui est refusé le droit syndical et qui sont seulement tolérés dans des syndicats français, ne sauraient avoir d'autre, dans leur mouvement revendicatif, que la défense de leurs intérêts vitaux et l'amélioration de leurs conditions de vie de beaucoup inférieures à celles de leurs camarades étrangers.

Le but de cette campagne devient donc très clair: discréditer ce mouvement revendicatif, en vue de différer indéfiniment l'octroi aux Marocains du droit syndical unanimement réclamé.

Le Secrétariat Général
du Parti de l'Istiqlal.

Rabat, le 28 *janvier* 1950.

JM 1015/5 No. 5

ARREST OF SPANISH GOVERNMENT AGENT BY TANGIER POLICE

Mr. Sterling to Mr. Bevin. (*Received* 13*th February*)

(No. 10) *Tangier,*
(Telegraphic) 13*th February*, 1950.

International police have arrested Spanish agent who has confessed to having decoyed five persons wanted by the Spanish police on board ship which took them to Spain, where they are now believed to be in prison. International police state that Spanish agents have been very active here recently, and complain of another case in which they

entered the house alleging themselves to be policemen and removed the effects of person previously expelled from the zone.

2. The arrested agent has not yet been charged and the Spanish Consul-General has asked for his release which the Administrator refused. He and the Chief of Police are indignant at the Spanish activities, and also at the Spanish press attacks on the zone in connexion with the alleged privateer smuggling reported in Tetuan despatch No. 6 of 8th February to the Foreign Office. The Administrator is however unwilling, himself supporter of the outcry, to bring the agent of the Spanish Government publicly to trial on such a charge. He has discussed the matter with the American Minister and myself and asked whether our Governments would be prepared to tell the Spanish Government that this sort of thing must stop.

3. The American Minister intends to speak to the Spanish Consul-General, and at my request has informed the French Consul-General.

4. I will telegraph further after concerting recommendations with my colleagues.

5. The events reported have been kept secret so far but there is always the possibility of leakage in the press.

JM 1192/3 No. 6

ARMS SMUGGLING INTO THE SPANISH ZONE OF MOROCCO

Consul-General Stirling (*Tangier*) *to Mr. Bevin.* (*Received* 18*th February*)

(No. 15) *Tangier,*
(Telegraphic) 18*th February*, 1950.

My immediately preceding telegram and my despatch No. 15: Smuggling of arms into Spanish Zone.

Enquiry is being prosecuted by International police. Spanish authorities went back on their offer to send to Tangier witnesses held by them and police officers were therefore sent [? omission] here to examine them in Tetuan. Results of such examination might in themselves have been considered suspect but in fact, on information obtained, International police have arrested other persons implicated whose statements confirm that some rifles were smuggled into Spanish Zone from Tangier and that they came from house of Shereef Darkawi. Police are searching Darkawi's house to-day and are interrogating him this afternoon. They will then pass evidence to tribunal who will decide whether Darkawi is to be arrested. Police are somewhat concerned about possible reaction of his followers, but in view of Spanish accusations I consider there was no alternative but to bring matter before court. So far there has been no trouble.

2. As far as evidence goes at present it appears. (1) that smuggling was on quite small-scale (Spanish official statement only mentions thirty-seven rifles); (2) rifles are of same series as some that were discovered here in 1938 and have presumably been hidden in zone ever since. No proof has yet come to light that Darkawi was instigated by other persons, and conclusion at the moment seems to be that he acted solely out of animosity against Spaniards. Case was almost certainly exaggerated by Spanish authorities to suit their own ends. Reports have been circulating for some time that Varela is to be replaced as High Commissioner and this may have been last attempt to prove himself indispensable. My French colleague has heard from source in High Commission that his departure has been decided on and that he will be given post on Regency Commission in Spain.

JM 1651/5 No. 7

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMITTEE'S ANTI-SMUGGLING ORDINANCES

Consul-General Stirling to Mr. Bevin. (*Received* 13*th March*)

(No. 30) *Tangier,*
Sir, 8*th March*, 1950.

On the receipt of your telegram No. 3 of 28th January regarding the control of exports from Tangier, I informed the president of the Committee of Control privately, as he had asked me to do, of the nature of your instructions to me. I added that,

exploited and there is no such thing as collective bargaining. The *Patronat* which was set up with the purpose of protecting the workers seems to have forgotten its original purpose and little or no help can be obtained from it.

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Le Secrétariat Général
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Rabat, le 28 *janvier* 1950.

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3. The American Minister intends to speak to the Spanish Consul-General, and at my request has informed the French Consul-General.

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JM 1651/5 No. 7

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMITTEE'S ANTI-SMUGGLING ORDINANCES

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Sir, 8*th March*, 1950.

On the receipt of your telegram No. 3 of 28th January regarding the control of exports from Tangier, I informed the president of the Committee of Control privately, as he had asked me to do, of the nature of your instructions to me. I added that,

though I had your authority to vote at my discretion for the proposed ordinances, I felt that we ought to consider amending the drafts to meet any legitimate grievance of the shipping companies. (Please see paragraph 3 of my letter to Mr. Clutton of 27th January.)

2. Mr. Plitt asked me to discuss any amendments which I thought necessary with the Spanish Consul-General with a view to the submission to the committee of agreed drafts.

3. I accordingly consulted representatives of the principal shipping companies here and amended the two draft ordinances to meet their only serious objection. As stated in my letter under reference, this referred to the proposed requirement that manifests should be submitted by ships before sailing. The revised drafts, of which I have the honour to enclose copies, provide for the maintenance of the existing practice whereby manifests may be submitted within twenty-four hours after ships have sailed.

4. When I discussed the matter with my Spanish colleague, though he was clearly pleased that His Majesty's Government were prepared to agree to the passing of the ordinances, he at first objected to the proposed alterations and, after consulting the Spanish representative in the Customs Service on the telephone, told me that he could not accept them. I accordingly agreed to discuss the matter further with the shipping representatives in the presence of the French head of the customs. I was able to inform M. del Castillo the same afternoon that M. Vic saw no objection to the alterations I had proposed.

5. There the matter rested for some time in view, no doubt, of the preoccupation of M. del Castillo with other matters, which, as you are aware, have recently been disturbing relations between the Spanish authorities and the International Administration. Finally, he informed me that he accepted my drafts and these were accordingly submitted to the Committee of Control at the meeting held on 27th February.

6. I did not think that you would regard my action in discussing the matter with the shipping interests and the Spanish Consul-General as inconsistent with your instructions that I should take no initiative in the matter. In order, however, to avoid any misunderstanding of our position I send Mr. Plitt the letter of which a copy is enclosed.

7. The two ordinances were passed unanimously by the Committee of Control (with the exception of the United States Minister who, as chairman, did not record a vote himself). This will, I hope, help to forestall complaints by the Spanish Government that the International Administration are unhelpful in their treatment of Spanish interests. Whether it will have and subsequential effect in reducing the volume of smuggling into Spain remains to be seen.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Excellency the Governor of Gibraltar and to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid.

I have, &c.
C. N. STIRLING.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7

Projet de Loi relatif aux Conditions d'Embarquement des Marchandises sur les Navires dans le Port de Tanger.

ARTICLE PREMIER

Aucune embarcation chargée ou sur lest ne pourra sortir du Port de Tanger sans que soit présenté au visa de la douane un manifeste portant le détail des marchandises exportées. Ce manifeste doit être déposé au plus tard dans les 24 heures qui suivent la sortie du bateau.

La présentation de ce manifeste est obligatoire quelle que soit la provenance des marchandises et leur situation au point de vue douanier. Elle est également obligatoire même si l'embarcation ne transporte aucune marchandise à la sortie du port de Tanger. La douane remettra une copie dûment visée dudit manifeste qui devra être annexée à la déclaration prévue par l'article 4 de la loi du 6 juin 1931 relative à la Police maritime du Port. Le défaut de présentation dudit manifeste de sortie sera sanctionné par application *de l'amende* prévue par l'article 81 de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

ARTICLE 2

La présentation du manifeste n'est pas obligatoire pour les embarcations qui, d'après leurs papiers de bord, ne sont pas habilitées au transport des marchandises. Cette exemption entraîne l'interdiction correspondante d'embarquer des marchandises dans le port de Tanger en vue de l'exportation, ladite interdiction étant applicable spécialement aux embarcations qui, selon leurs papiers de bord, sont affectuées exclusivement à la pêche.

ARTICLE 3

Il ne pourra être embarqué plus de provisions de bord que celles qui seront estimées normalement nécessaires pour les membres de l'équipage et éventuellement les passagers selon la durée présumée du voyage. Les provisions de bord doivent figurer dans un paragraphe spécial du manifeste prévu à l'article 1, ou feront l'objet d'une déclaration expresse s'il s'agit des embarcations auxquelles se réfère l'article 2.

ARTICLE 4

Tout embarquement ou tentative d'embarquement de marchandises en infraction aux dispositions des articles précédents, sera puni d'une amende qui ne pourra excéder le triple de la valeur desdites marchandises ainsi que de la confiscation de celles-ci. Une peine de prison de 5 jours à 6 mois pourra, en outre, être infligée aux auteurs de l'infraction ainsi qu'à leurs complices. Le navire sera retenu jusqu'au paiement de l'amende.

ARTICLE 5

Dans le cas où il existerait des soupçons au sujet d'un embarquement clandestin de marchandises à bord d'un navire ancré dans le port de Tanger ou dans les eaux territoriales de la Zone, le Service des Douanes procédera à la visite du navire en observant les formalités prévues par les traités. Tant que la visite n'aura pas été effectuée, un ou plusieurs gardiens pourront être installés à bord pour empêcher tout trafic illégal.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7

Projet de Loi portant Modification de la Loi du 6 Juin 1931 *relative à la Police maritime du Port*

ARTICLE UNIQUE.

Les articles 4, 40, 41 et 47 de la Loi du 6 Juin 1931, relative à la Police maritime du Port, sont modifiés comme suit :

Article 4

Tout capitaine de navire qui mouille dans la baie ou qui entre dans le port doit, dans le délai de 24 heures, remettre au bureau du Capitaine du Port, une déclaration écrite et dûment signée indiquant la nationalité, le matricule et le nom du navire, le nom de son capitaine, celui de l'armateur ou du consignataire, le tonnage, le tirant d'eau, le genre de navigation pratiquée, la nature de la cargaison, le manifeste des marchandises à décharger, la liste des passagers, les points de provenance et de destination. Cette formalité peut être remplie par l'agent de la compagnie de navigation à laquelle appartient le navire.

Dans les 24 heures qui suivent le départ du port ou de la baie, le capitaine ou l'agent maritime doit également présenter une déclaration comportant le manifeste des marchandises et la liste des passagers embarqués.

Pour les bateaux qui fréquentent habituellement le port, les déclarations imposées ci-dessus pourront être limitées aux seules indications qui offrent un caractère variable. Lesdites déclarations seront numérotées et enregistrées sur un registre spécial par ordre de présentation.

Aucune embarcation ne pourra entrer ni sortir du port ou de la baie, quels que soient son tonnage, la navigation qu'elle pratique ou la nature de son activité si elle ne se trouve pas en mesure de fournir les déclarations imposées ci-dessus par suite de défaut de nationalisation, d'immatriculation ou de dénomination. Toute infraction à cette interdiction sera considérée comme preuve définitive de l'exercice d'un traffic illicite.

Article 40

Le capitaine d'un navire ou l'agent de la compagnie de navigation intéressée qui aura consignée *sciemment* de fausses indications sur les déclarations imposées par l'article 4 de la présente loi, sera puni d'une amende de 5,000 à 50,000 fr. à laquelle s'ajoutera, s'il y a lieu, une amende pouvant s'élever jusqu'à 10 fois les droits fraudés.

Le capitaine du navire ou l'agent de la compagnie de navigation intéressée qui, pour quelque motif que ce soit, ne présentera pas les déclarations prévues par l'article 4, sera puni d'une amende de 10,000 à 100,000 fr. et d'une peine de prison de 6 jours à 6 mois, ou seulement de l'une de ces peines.

Le capitaine ou l'agent de la compagnie de navigation qui n'aura pas déposé les déclarations prévues par l'article 4, dans les 24 heures de l'arrivée ou du départ du navire dans le port ou la baie, sera également puni d'une amende de 3,000 fr. par jour de retard.

Article 41

Toute embarcation qui entrera ou sortira du port ou de la baie sans satisfaire aux conditions qui lui permettent d'établir les déclarations prévues par l'article 4 et qui, par ce seul fait, est considérée comme exerçant un traffic illicite, fera l'objet d'une saisie.

Article 47

Le Capitaine du Port et ses adjoints sont spécialement chargés de constater les

infractions à la présente loi et aux règlements mentionnés dans son article II. Les procès-verbaux dressés par eux seront transmis à l'Autorité Judiciaire compétente et feront foi sans qu'il soit nécessaire de les ratifier.

L'inexécution de cette obligation par le Capitaine du Port et ses adjoints sera punie d'une amende de 10,000 à 100,000 fr. qui pourra s'élever au double du maximum en cas de récidive. En outre, une peine de prison de 6 jours à 6 mois leur sera infligée lorsqu'il s'agira d'embarcations sans nationalité, sans immatriculation et sans dénomination.

Enclosure 3 in No. 7

21-35 *Le 21 février 1950.*

M. le Président et cher Collègue,

Quand le Comité de Contrôle à discuté à sa 102ème séance la question de l'entrée et la sortie de marchandise et la police maritime du port, j'ai cru devoir faire valoir une réserve dans le sens que je ne pourrais pas appuyer des ordonnances proposées au comité sans avoir demandé le point de vue de mon Gouvernement.

Dans le but de faciliter les travaux du comité, il est peut-être utile de vous faire savoir que j'ai maintenant reçu des instructions de Londres et que celles-ci me permettent de me rallier au principe d'une législation par ordonnance si le comité en général est en faveur d'une telle mesure. Dans l'opinion de mon Gouvernement, néanmoins, une action éventuelle dans ce sens devrait être considérée comme un cas exceptionnel et ne pas créer un précédent favorable à une ingérence plus générale par les Puissances dans la vie économique de Tanger.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir ci-inclus les textes des deux projets soumis au comité à sa 103ème séance, auxquels j'ai apporté quelques modifications qui, si elles étaient acceptables à mes collègues, me permettraient de voter en faveur des ordonnances.

Veuillez agréer, M. le Président et cher Collègue, l'assurance de ma haute considération,

Le Ministre Plénipotentiaire
chargé du Consulat Général
de Grande-Bretagne,
C. N. STIRLING.

M. E. A. Plitt,
Agent Diplomatique des Etats-Unis d'Amérique,
Président du Comité de Contrôle.
Tanger.

JM 1651/6 No. 8

THE TANGIER CURRENCY MARKET

Consul-General Stirling to Mr. Allen. (Received 27th March)

Tangier,
14th March, 1950.

Dear Allen,

Many thanks for your letter JM 161/3 of 28th February about the proposed ordinances to restrict smuggling and the effects on the Spanish economy of the leakage of pesetas through Tangier.

You will have received my despatch No. 30 of 3rd March reporting the passing of the ordinances and also a long report (my despatch No. 27 of 27th February) about the position of the peseta here. I am diffident about expressing an opinion from here on the effects of the Tangier money market on the economies of Spain and the Spanish and French Protectorates, but I hope that that despatch will give you some of the background that you want, and perhaps it may be of use if I sum up what seem to me to be the principal factors although I am not in a position to give them quantitative values.

As regards the Spanish territories, the main effects of the Tangier free market seem to be the following:—

(*a*) The contraband trade: The goods, mostly of American origin, which are smuggled into Spain from here are paid for through the Tangier market. If it were not possible to buy dollars for pesetas in Tangier the trade would presumably come to an end, however, easy it were to introduce the goods physically into Spain. This trade consists mainly of semi-luxuries such as cigarettes, coffee, drugs, nylon stockings, &c. It also suggested (see Madrid telegram No. 39 of 26th February) that dollars bought in Tangier are used to pay for American motor cars introduced clandestinely into Spain. This may still be the case, as regards payment, though the physical traffic in cars, which used to be shipped from Tangier to Spain via Gibraltar, has been stopped.

(*b*) The flight of capital: Since the war a good deal of hot money from Spain and other countries has sought refuge in Tangier where it can be converted at any time into hard currency. It is believed that the Spanish Government at one time allowed or connived at the transfer of some capital in order to strengthen their position here by increasing Spanish holdings of real estate in Tangier.

Both (*a*) and (*b*) seem to represent a more or less useless drain on the Spanish economy in so far as they are financed by the sale of peseta credits in Spain to persons who would otherwise be paying foreign exchange to Spain through official channels. In so far as they are paid for by the smuggling of peseta notes into Tangier, of which there is a good deal, Spain would appear to lose nothing directly, but the throwing of these notes on the market helps to cheapen the peseta and thus increases the cost to Spain of transactions under (*c*), (*d*) and (*e*) below, and at the same time increases the incentive to foreigners to buy cheap pesetas in Tangier rather than accept the Spanish Government's official rate.

(*c*) The purchase of essential raw materials with hard currency obtained in Tangier: As stated in my despatch No. 27, there is a general consensus of reports that the Spanish Government are encouraging or conniving at this to an increasing extent.

(*d*) Compensation trade: This as between the Spanish Zone and Tangier is authorised by the Protectorate authorities, but the volume is not large as Spanish Morocco has not much to sell.

(*e*) Government purchases of hard currency: There have been persistent rumours here that the Spanish Government have themselves been buying dollars on the Tangier market, and the report is confirmed in Madrid telegram No. 39.

In respect of both (*c*) and (*e*) (and also (*d*) as far as it goes) the Tangier market would appear to perform a useful service for the Spanish economy by enabling Spain to obtain hard currency, or the equivalent, of which she is in urgent need. She could presumably get much the same result by devaluing the peseta, but if she brought it down to a rate which represented its real value, as the French have done with the franc, it is reasonable to assume that the Tangier leak would largely dry up; *i.e.*, both the advantages and disadvantages of the free market here from the Spanish point of view would substantially disappear.

As operators in the Tangier market naturally do not disclose any figures it is difficult to weigh the "pros" under (*c*), (*d*) and (*e*) against the "cons" under (*a*) and (*b*). Nor have I any means of judging how easy it would be, if the Tangier market were closed, to transfer some or all of the operations in question to other free markets. It is, however, obvious that Tangier, owing to its geographical position and close relations with Spain, offers exceptional facilities for evading the Spanish exchange control, which must be galling to the Spanish authorities, although it also provides them with an easy way of obtaining small quantities of dollars to keep alive their essential industries. This rather vapid conclusion is, I am afraid, as far as I can get in the case of Spanish territory.

I do not think that the Tangier market has any longer an important effect on the economy of French territory. Formerly a considerable volume of imports into the French Zone was financed through Tangier, as the Protectorate authorities issued licences freely to importers who were prepared to find their own exchange. This was stopped last year and although the French have agreed, as the result of prolonged negotiations with the United States Government, to allow exceptions in the case of licences for certain "essential" goods, I understand that French importers now obtain their foreign exchange mostly in the *marché parallèle* in Paris, where I believe that the rate differs very little from that quoted in Tangier. By establishing this free market and also by fixing very liberal allowances for the bringing of francs into France and French Morocco by tourists and returning residents, the French authorities have, in fact, succeeded in making the franc scarce in Tangier and seem to have solved the problem of the leakage of francs through this market. It is believed that a good deal of capital has actually been repatriated from Tangier to France since the franc was stabilised at its present level.

I am sending copies of this letter to Hankey in Madrid and to Cane and Hope Gill.

Yours ever,

CHARLES STIRLING.

COMMERCIAL AND CUSTOMS AGREEMENTS BETWEEN MOROCCO AND OTHER COUNTRIES

(1)

Note by Foreign Office Research Department

Foreign Office,
15th March, 1950.

Commercial and customs agreements between Morocco and other States date from treaties signed between Morocco and Spain in 1799, and Morocco and various other countries during the 19th century. More recently they have been regulated by the Morocco-Egyptian Agreement signed by France and Great Britain, 8th April, 1904, The General Act of Algeciras, 1906, the Franco-German Treaties of 1909 and 1911, various articles in the Versailles Treaty, the abolition between 1914 and 1937 of the capitulatory rights of all countries except the United States.

2. By the Morocco-Egyptian Agreement between France and Great Britain, 8th April, 1904, the latter State agreed to recognise the special position of France in Morocco in return for a life recognition of her own in Egypt. Act 4 of this agreement stipulated that commercial liberty should prevail for at least thirty years. By a secret article the maintenance of capitulatory rights in Egypt and Morocco was made inter-dependent.

3. The Algeciras Conference (resulting in the General Act of that name) was really a duel between Germany and France (backed by Great Britain, Russia, Spain and Italy). The aim of the former was to secure the internationalisation of Morocco; of the latter, to make the country completely French. Neither contestant achieved complete success. In the economic field France had to accept the internationalisation of the State Bank (for a period of forty years). Germany succeeded in establishing the principle of the " open door " and in order to ensure its operation two international Customs Commissions were set up at Tangier. The actual tariff decided on does not figure in the act itself, which stipulates only that an additional duty of 2½ per cent. *ad valorem* (whose proceeds were to be devoted to public works) should be added. In fact there was already an existing import duty of 10 per cent. *ad valorem* which had been imposed by treaties signed by Morocco and Spain (1799 and 1851), Morocco and the United States (1836), Morocco and Great Britain (1856) and Morocco and Germany (1890). This was maintained for all except a few specified categories of goods, and to it was added the 2½ per cent. already mentioned.

4. In luxury goods, precious metals, precious stones, silks, wines and distilled liqueurs, in accordance with Franco-Moroccan agreements of 1892, a 5 per cent. instead of 10 per cent. duty was placed. This was, of course, designed to benefit France. as many of the goods were characteristically French products. In addition, fertiliser, agricultural machinery, books and music were to be admitted duty free.

5. With regard to the land frontier between Algeria and Morocco a duty (*ad valorem*) of 5 per cent. (dating from the Franco-Moroccan Treaty of 1902) was maintained. By a dahir (decree of the Sultan) of 1928 this *ad valorem* duty was retained for goods to be consumed in East Morocco. Those passing into West Morocco were to pay dues equal to the customs duties on goods imported by sea and a special 2½ per cent. tax (see also paragraph 13).

6. The compromise effected between French and international interests in Morocco did little to check the anarchy and confusion spreading in the country. Franco-Spanish police control in the ports was inadequate. French fear of German intervention led in 1909 to a Franco-German economic agreement about Morocco which, if it had not broken down, would probably have led to a wider understanding. The economic sources of wines, public works and railways in the country were to be shared between the two countries. Finally, in 1911, Germany, in return for a small part of the French Congo, definitely recognised French ascendancy.

7. In 1912 the principal international obligations of France in Morocco were defined by the Treaty of Madrid (1880), the Franco-British and Franco-Spanish Treaties of 1904, the Algeciras Act (1906), the Franco-German Treaty of 1911, the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1912 and the Franco-Moroccan Protectorate Treaty of 1912. Since this date there have been some modifications in their provisions. The two most important have been the exclusion of Germany and Austria from Moroccan affairs by the Peace Treaties of 1918–19, and the abolition between 1914 and 1937 of the capitulatory rights of all countries except the United States.

8. By articles 141–146 of the Versailles Treaty, Germany renounced all rights, titles and privileges conferred on her by the General Act of Algeciras as well as by the Franco-German Agreements of 9th February, 1909, and 4th November, 1911; she declared all treaties, agreements, arrangements and contracts concluded by her with the Sherifian Empire to be abrogated, and undertook not to intervene in any way in negotiations relating to Morocco which may take place between France and other Powers All German property in Morocco was handed over to the Sultan, and all German shares in the State Bank to France by way of reparations. The same terms were imposed on Austria by the Treaty of St. Germain (1919).

9. Following out the provisions of the Versailles Treaty the Moroccan Government issued a decree in 1920 prohibiting the import of German merchandise except by licence and on condition of paying a surtax. But by the Franco-German Treaty of 1926 these restrictions were removed, and Germany granted similar treatment to that of other countries.

10. The renunciation of capitulatory rights was made by Germany (1913), Russia, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Norway (1914), Denmark and Belgium (1915), Italy and the Netherlands (1916). Subsequently Japan and various South American and Balkan States which had not been parties to any treaties establishing a capitulatory régime in Morocco; specifically renounced capitulatory rights. Great Britain retained hers, which she based on article 2 of the Franco-British Agreement of 1904 (making them dependent of the situation in Egypt) and not the Treaty of Madrid. In 1937, following the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 whereby she promised to abolish capitulatory rights in Egypt, Great Britain relinquished her own in Morocco. The United States indicated her willingness to follow Britain's suit, but the outbreak of war, 1939, suspended negotiations.

11. With regard to the Customs Committee created by the Algeciras Act, these were suppressed by the Statute of Tangier in 1923. From this time their functions were carried out by a commission composed of representatives from the French, Spanish and Tangier Zones. The International State Bank continued but never fulfilled the rôle intended for it—of establishing international financial control over Morocco.

12. The *ad valorem* duty of 12½ per cent. (*i.e.*, the initial 10 per cent. under treaties prior to Algeciras, and the additional 2½ per cent. added to Algeciras) was maintained. In 1938, however, a convention was signed by France and Britain which gave France the right to vary it and to substitute specific duties where it was considered desirable. Provision was made for the institution of a quota system for given imports and for new customs regulations. The treaty, however, has never come into force. Neither of the contracting parties was satisfied with it, and its non-ratification was also partly due to Britain's desire to come to some understanding about it with the United States.

13. By a Moroccan decree of 1936 land frontier customs were raised from 5 per cent. (the rate laid down by the Algeciras Act) to 12½ per cent., and thus the tariff of all Morocco was unified. As regards goods in transit, by a Franco-British treaty of 1917, British goods like French are allowed to pass free across the Algero-Moroccan frontier. This agreement was to be valid for thirty years.

14. France is under no specific treaty obligation to maintain the import duty of 12½ per cent. *ad valorem*. The only import duty which it is incumbent on her by treaty to levy is that of 2½ per cent. to be devoted to public works, imposed on her by Article 66 of the Algeciras Act. But this is expressly *à titre temporaire*, and so, presumably, it could be abrogated if desired.

To an observance of the principle of the open door in trade, however, France is bound not by one but by a whole series of treaties, the Franco-British and Franco-Spanish of 1904, the Algeciras Act, the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1912, the International Statute of Tangier (1923). She has already infringed to a minor extent the principle by certain import restrictions imposed on the ground of " vital necessity."

15. By the same treaties she is also bound to observance of the principle of economic equality with regard to public works and services. Over many rights in Morocco she has assumed complete control (in spite of the provisions of Article 12 of the Algeciras Act) following the discovery of large quantities of phosphates in 1919. She has, however, on the whole, respected the obligation imposed on her by the Treaty of Madrid and that of Algeciras to apply the principle

of economic equality to the acquisition of property by all foreigners in the Sherifian Empire.

16. France's post-war policy appears to be based upon making further attempts (in addition to the minor ones of pre-war days) to impose restrictions on the import of foreign goods. These would appear to be in contradiction to the spirit and letter of existing arrangements. However, in view of the age of some of these treaties, and the expression that in some provisions they are of a temporary nature, she may feel justified in asking for some revision, pending which she will endeavour to establish certain *faits accomplis*.

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(2)

Memorandum by Economic Intelligence Department

Foreign Office,
28th March, 1950.

It is clear from Research Department's note that legally the French are still under certain obligations to support the principle of the "open door" in that section of the Sherifian Empire which is under their protection. The position of France is that of protector Power in a State possessing an independent international status, and the French Government is party to the collective conventions upon which that status is based. The most important of the conventions which regulate the special economic and tariff rights of the protector Power is that of 30th March, 1912 (The Franco-Moroccan Protectorate Convention) by which the Powers accept her preponderance in this part of Morocco on condition that there should be no departure from this principle of economic parity which Germany had obliged her to accept at Algeciras.

2. Count Bulow's phrase "The open door," used after 1906 to describe this principle was never very clearly defined, and is somewhat misleading.

3. There had been tariffs since the beginning of the 19th century. As stated in paragraph VI of F.O.R.D.'s note, it does not imply a specific obligation on the part of the protecting Power to maintain the tariff at any particular level or to keep it *ad valorem*. What it does imply is that there should be no discriminatory tariffs or import restrictions, and that control should be vested in a Customs Committee. After 1923 this was the commission set up by the statute of Tangier. Since 1936 the Moroccan tariff has been unified, and a 12½ per cent. *ad valorem* duty has been imposed on goods imported, both seaborne and overland. It is also specified that seven ports in French Morocco should be kept open to the ships of all nations. The ports are Casablanca, Rabat, Port Lyautey, Fedala, Mazagan, Safi and Mogadi Agadir was added to this list in 1930. Of these, much the most important is Casablanca which handles about three-quarters of the country's trade and nearly four-fifths of its shipping. A further implication of the "open door" principle was that France, as protecting Power, should maintain economic liberty within Morocco. The monopolisation of the Moroccan phosphate mines was challenged by Italy in 1936 as an infringement of this condition. However, when the case came before the Permanent Court at The Hague it was dismissed as without their jurisdiction, and in practice this proviso has since ceased to be observed.

4. These international agreements and the cumbrus tariff machinery set up to implement them were of doubtful benefit to the internal economy of the country. The welfare of Morocco had not been an important consideration for the Powers at Algeciras. Morocco's economic bargaining power was severely restricted, and she found it difficult to open up markets for exports. On the other hand, the position was exploited by certain countries, notably Japan, which made a practice of dumping surplus manufactures in Morocco. The commission prevented her making any specific discrimination in favour of Metropolitan France, although she did obtain important customs concessions on the import of grain and vegetables into that country.

5. The major part of Moroccan trade has been with France. The French supplied 33·5 per cent. by value of total imports in 1938, 55·7 per cent. in 1947, and 58·21 per cent. in 1948. France received from Morocco 44·8 per cent., 62·13 per cent. and 64·8 per cent. of total exports in the same years. Great Britain now stands second amongst Morocco's customers. 6·69 per cent. by value in 1948. 1949 figures are not available, but exports to Great Britain have recently shown a marked increase. Imports from this country are, however, very small. 2·09 per cent. of the total in 1948 (1,565 million francs). Imports from the dollar area are considerably greater, 13 per cent. of the total in 1948, and more in 1949.

6. The ratio of value of exports to imports for French Morocco steadily increased after 1918, and by 1938 the gap had been reduced to 30 per cent. 1948 trade figures reveal, however, that this trend has not continued, and the value of imports is again almost double that of exports. Trading with the sterling area shows a small credit balance, but there are large deficits with both the franc and dollar areas. The import licensing restrictions imposed by the Protectorate Government are presumably designed to check this drain on the country's resources especially the drain on dollars.

7. However, it is difficult to see how the protecting Power can legitimately advance the plea that they have insufficient sterling on Moroccan account, and refuse licences to British importers on those grounds alone. It will be useful if the Consul-General at Rabat could supply details of any cases where this has occurred.

8. The Americans objected to the import licensing regulations imposed by the Moroccan Government on the grounds that they still held capitulatory rights. As mentioned in the October Economic Report from Rabat, the United States Government agreed to a clause which placed their nationals on the same footing as those of other countries, upon which the American Trade Association of Morocco brought an action at law to determine the right of the Department of State to ignore a treaty between the two countries which had been approved by the Senate. The time seems overdue for the abrogation of these capitulatory privileges which America alone amongst the Powers continues to enjoy. Britain abolished her rights in 1938, and British merchants are therefore subject at law to the orders issued by the Moroccan authorities.

9. Import licensing and currency control which in some form or another are to-day almost universal, cannot be regarded in themselves as infringements of the rights granted to the protecting Power. But discrimination in the allotment of licences and quotas, something extremely difficult to substantiate, would certainly be ultra vires. The revision of the customs dues, which Rabat alleges is now being contemplated by the authorities would presumably require the sanction of the Tangier commission; it might be regarded as contrary to the "open door" principle; but it would not, I imagine, be an infringement of our rights unless it included some form of tariff preference. Moreover, in view of the 1938 Convention between His Majesty's Government and France, which, although never ratified, is tantamount to an admission of France's rights in the matter of revision, it would surely not be advisable to insist upon the letter of earlier treaties and conventions.

JM 1192/7 No. 10

TRIAL OF THE SHEREEF OF THE DARKAOUA

Consul-General Stirling to Mr. Bevin. (Received 11th April)

(No. 51. Confidential) *Tangier,*
Sir, *5th April, 1950.*

With reference to my despatch No. 25 of 22nd February, I have the honour to report that the Shereef of the Darkaoua and twenty-three others were tried before the Mixed Tribunal on 31st March on charges of being in possession of war material and organising an attempt against the peace of the Spanish Zone. All the accused were condemned. (Articles 139 and 139 *bis* of the penal code.) The Shereef was sentenced to three and a half years' imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 francs. The other defendants received shorter terms of imprisonment varying from three to nine months.

2. The French *procureur,* M. Rodière, conducted the prosecution with an evident desire to avoid giving offence to the Spanish authorities. It was, in fact, thought at one time that he intended to prosecute only on the first charge (possession of war material) in order to avoid discussion of the Darkawi's allegations that his activities in relation to Spanish territory had been instigated from Tetuan. As this might have left it open to

the Spaniards to ask for the extradition of the Shereef to answer charges of subversive activity in their zone, steps were taken to see that this charge also was tried in the Tangier court.

3. M. Rodière referred only incidently to the fact alleged to have been played in the affair by Spanish *agents provocateurs* and pointed out that, if the Shereef had in fact been approached by such agents, it was his duty not to listen to them.

4. The only one of the alleged *agents provocateurs* who appeared in court was a certain Carlos Martin, a Spaniard who passes as a Left-wing journalist, and who, according to the Shereef, tried to persuade him to give him a signed article outlining his plans for action in the Spanish Zone and offered to supply him with arms. The *procureur* asked for a sentence of five years imprisonment against Martin as an accomplice of the Shereef, but this was reduced by the court to six months. There is reason to believe that Martin was in fact in touch with the Spanish authorities and he probably acted on their behalf in approaching the Darkawi, but no clear proof of this was brought before the court.

5. The two lawyers who defended the Shereef unlike the *procureur* showed no tenderness for the feelings of the Spanish authorities. Maître Bienvenue, who is one of the most respected members of the local bar, insisted on the important part played by numerous emissaries, including Martin, who had approached his client and on the political aspect of the crimes alleged against him. Maître Chérif, who has the reputation of a powerful but unscrupulous advocate, showed even less reticence, and included in his defence a violent attack on the Spanish authorities, in which he argued that the Shereef was wrongly accused of subverting order, since he was merely attacking a régime which had itself overthrown law and order in the Spanish Zone.

6. The Spaniards have not so far reacted in any way to the conduct of the proceedings, which took place before the Italian judge sitting with French and Spanish assessors. The Spanish newspapers, *España* and *Africa*, have simply omitted from their reports of the trial passages which they must have found embarrassing.

7. Equally, there has been no sign of any reaction among the native population. Opinion in general is I understand divided, some thinking that three and a half years is a severe sentence to pass on a religious dignitary and others that the Darkawi was so deeply involved in mercenary politics that he deserved all he has got.

8. The Administrator informs me that he has suggested privately to the Shereef that he would be well advised not to appeal against the sentence passed on him, since then the case would come before the Spanish judge, who might be expected to increase rather than to reduce the penalty. As soon as the question of appeal is settled Mr. Van Vredenburch will try to arrange for the Shereef to be transferred to the French Zone to serve his sentence. In this I know he has the support of the French authorities, who seem anxious to get the Darkawi into their territory. I think that this is probably merely part of their general desire to stifle trouble everywhere in Morocco. I understand that they hope to induce the Sultan to intervene and banish the Shereef to some remote district, where he can do no harm.

9. There are still rumours that the Spaniards intend to ask for the Shereef to be handed over to them for judgment on some charge or other now that the trial here is over; but I am inclined to discount them. As far as I can see the Spanish authorities have nothing to gain by pursuing the question. Their wisest course is clearly to allow the mud to settle, as it will rapidly do if they keep quiet.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Excellency The Governor of Gibraltar, to His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid and to His Majesty's Consuls-General at Rabat and Tetuan.

I have, &c.

C. N. STIRLING.

JF 1052/9 No. 11

SITUATION IN FRENCH MOROCCO

Sir O. Harvey to Mr. Younger. (Received 30th May)

(No. 334. Confidential) *Paris, 27th May, 1950.*

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a particularly interesting report by the military attaché to this embassy on his recent visit to French Morocco.

2. The principal points which emerge from Brigadier Macnab's report seem to me to be the following:—

(*a*) the French troops in Morocco are at present sufficient for the maintenance of internal order. But they are constantly depleted by the need for reinforcements in Indo-China, are equipped with obsolete weapons, and are totally insufficient to defend this important area in the event of war;

(*b*) in spite of a certain amount of lip-service to democratic ideas, the present policy towards the native is, as Brigadier Macnab puts it, "to keep him down rather than educate him up." The French authorities in Morocco think it will be twenty-five years before Morocco is ready for independence, but Brigadier Macnab, whose views in this respect coincide with those expressed in paragraphs 8 and 9 of Mr. Hayter's despatch No. 164 of 7th March last, considers that the French may well be obliged by events to proceed much more rapidly than this;

(*c*) the French in Morocco are entirely cut off from Europe and have very little interest in or knowledge of international affairs. Morocco is a world apart;

(*d*) there remains a certain amount of suspicion of British and American activities in Morocco, and a distinct resentment of any interference in or criticism of the French régime there.

I have, &c.

OLIVER HARVEY.

Enclosure in No. 11

Report by Brigadier G. A. C. Macnab on visit to Morocco, March–April 1950

1. General

At the invitation of General Juin, the Resident General, I have recently carried out a seventeen day tour of Morocco by car. Nothing could have been kinder than the welcome I received from him and this was repeated everywhere I went. I was met on arrival at Casablanca by the Regional Commander, General de Langlade, an old friend who hustled me off the boat without customs or any other formalities and had my car unloaded with remarkable speed; I drove straight to Rabat, was shown into General Juin's study and my itinerary was decided on the spot by him and his military secretary.

2. Itinerary

My journey covered all the principal towns in the Protectorate. Starting at Port Lyautey, I worked down the coast through Rabat to Casablanca: from there I went south to Marrakesh where I paid a rapid visit to the Anti-Atlas and the country to the south of it; continuing eastwards I spent a day or two in the Moyen Atlas in the region of Kasba Tadla, Kenifra and Azrou, with an excursion into the mountains round Midelt and Ain Leuh. Turning north again, I visited Fez and Meknes and finally spent a day in the hilly country along the Spanish frontier north of Ouezzane, before passing through the Spanish Zone to Tangier and then via Gibraltar and Madrid back to Paris.

In the course of 1,000 miles motoring in Morocco I met and talked to all the commanders of formations and military regions, as well as various civilian officials of all grades: many kindly asked me to meals or to stay a night. In addition I received every possible assistance and kindness from the British Consul-Generals at Rabat and Tangier and from the British Consuls at Casablanca and Fez, with all of whom I had interesting and profitable conversations.

Unfortunately time was short and the programme tight: I was nearly always pressed for time and in consequence some of my impressions are bound to rest on insufficiently strong foundations. Since my visit was naturally mainly military, I was unable to concentrate sufficient time on study of economic, cultural or educational aspects.

This is the best season of the year to visit Morocco and local commanders are in consequence overwhelmed with a variety of official visitors from France. French officers are poor and their resources strained by this

stream of official swanners and for this reason I stayed whenever I could in local hotels. I had luckily brought with me a supply of Scotch whisky which was much appreciated and brought one or two tiresome commanders into a much more agreeable frame of mind. Considerable efforts are being made in the country to attract tourists: but except for such notable exceptions as Fez and Marrakesh, accommodation is generally indifferent and much remains to be done before any large scale incursion of tourists can be counted on.

3. Political Considerations

I had lunch with General Juin and also a long conversation with him in his office. General Juin enjoys a very high prestige among both natives and Europeans, not only because he knows the country and its problems well, but also because he has clear ideas on policy and sees them carried out. He was very critical of our post-war policy in granting independence to India and Burma; he considered our action precipitate and our policy unsound; these countries were neither ready for, nor capable of, self-government to-day and he was convinced that both would go Communist within five years. I suggested that our policy was a generous one and therefore likely to ensure their goodwill, make them reliant on us for advice and technical assistance in the future and be a potent factor in keeping them inside the Commonwealth. If there was a risk it was better to take it early and to get credit for it; the alternative was to wait until we were forced to grant it and I ventured the remark that this policy had been at least partly responsible for the present situation in Indo-China. I suggested that he discuss this with Lord Louis Mountbatten who, with the First Sea Lord and the Duke of Edinburgh, was lunching with him the day after I left.

General Juin then went on to discuss the present situation in the Protectorate and his policy. He pointed out that General Nogues had been forced during the war years 1940–42 when things were running badly for France to increase the authority of the Sultan in order to avoid trouble. At that time French hold on Morocco had been very tenuous and it was a miracle that it had held and a great tribute to French administration. He would not criticise that policy but it had made things very difficult for him because the Sultan had been egged on by young nationalists to make more and more demands; it had not been easy to disabuse him tactfully of what he had come to regard as his rights.

General Juin said there was no hurry to give additional powers to the native in Morocco: there was a serious shortage of trained native personnel capable of exercising control and his policy was to proceed very slowly in the direction of independence. He also spoke of the effect that the promise of independence in Cyrenaica would have on Morocco; nationalism in the Protectorate, though not yet a serious problem, had a strong hold and was growing; communism was a good deal less strong and making little headway and causing as yet no worries. There was no sign that the two might combine and he thought there were no stores of concealed arms. His policy therefore was not to encourage any increase in the Sultan's authority (which his adherents are demanding) and not to hurry along plans for the independence of the country nor encourage immediate hopes of such independence. If anything, rather the contrary, but he had plans on foot for giving natives increased participation in local affairs and he mentioned twenty-five years ahead as the minimum period that ought to elapse before the country was ripe for self-government.

4. General Impressions

One is warned before arriving at Casablanca that it is not representative of Morocco. Nevertheless as the first place one sees in the country it is bound to leave an impression, and an impression of quite remarkable progress. One of the results of the disturbed situation in Europe during the years 1946–48 was to encourage very large amounts of funk money to be transferred from Europe to Morocco, most of which has gone into bricks and mortar. A great deal is still coming in but the peak year is generally thought to have been 1949. Even so the expansion and building activity in Casablanca to-day is remarkable. The city has a fine port with large modern streets, parks and buildings. Enormous factories of all sorts are springing up on the outskirts towards Ain Sebaa and Fedala. Building activity is responsible for a total daily consumption of 12,000 tons of cement and the town from the sea looks to be covered in a pall of grey dust from two huge cement factories just outside. American cars and trucks predominate. There are 14,000 registered in Casablanca alone. British cars are noticeably absent. Large gangs of native labour live on the outskirts of the town in lean-to shelters, composed mainly of old petrol tins and sheets of galvanised iron. In its present stage of development the town is quite horrible.

Throughout Morocco one cannot help being struck by the progress made in such a comparatively short time. Though first setting foot in the country in 1907 it was not until after the first world war that the French really began to develop the country and they have achieved remarkable results which one can perhaps appreciate all the more when one passes through the squalor of the Spanish Zone. Roads are everywhere excellent, railways mostly electrified, agriculture flourishing in those districts where it is farmed by French colonists; in other areas there is little or no difference in the methods employed by the natives to those used 1,000 years ago, but the French are making a major effort to educate the native to modern methods. The country is very rich in minerals, especially in the Anti-Atlas area, but even so enormous resources hitherto untapped are known to exist.

The greatest problem is the shortage of water, but irrigation is being improved and barrages constructed; in the domain of education and health much is being done, but time did not permit any detailed examination of this aspect.

What is perhaps most surprising is the extraordinary lack of interest shown in European and even French affairs. One has the feeling of being at the other end of the world instead of just six hours' flying time from Paris and this is particularly noticeable in conversation with the average Frenchman who, though interested in details of cultural life in Paris, showed no interest whatever in international affairs, but is wholly wrapped up his own business in Morocco.

5. General Administration of the Protectorate

The Sultan of Morocco is the titular and religious head of the Protectorate, assisted by a central "Maghzen," composed of a number of Viziers co-ordinated by the Grand Vizier, which is responsible for native affairs. The Grand Vizier also controls the Pashas and Caids who represent the Sultan in the various regions. Delegates of the Grand Vizier work in liaison with the Directors of Finance, Agriculture, Commerce and Forests, Public Works, P.T.T., Mines and Industrial Production, Public Health, Labour and with the Judicial Council.

Real power is of course in the hands of the Resident-General who is assisted by three special Cabinets—civil, military and diplomatic. Under him are various civilian directorates, of which the Direction de l'Intérieur co-ordinates the action of the French authorities with the regional and local administration at all levels.

At present the administration is half civil, half military; not only are certain regions still commanded by general officers, but along both the northern and southern frontiers there are what are called zones of insecurity, which are in fact military sub-areas in which no white settlement is permitted. It was explained to me that these zones are constantly diminishing and that in fact there is no question of insecurity: they are retained, however, for two main reasons, firstly, to ensure some sort of native reserve and, secondly, to prevent undesirable speculation in land with consequent adverse effect on the native population.

The country is divided into the following autonomous regions, the commanders of which have the right of direct access to the Resident-General. See map 1/500,000 attached at Appendix A.(1)

(*a*) *Civil Regions*

Rabat.
Casablanca.
Oujda.

(*b*) *Military Regions—*

Marrakesh: General de Hauteville.
Meknes: General Lebianc.
Fez: General Laparra.
Agadir–Confins: General Miguel.

(*c*) *Responsibility for purely Military Districts within Civil Regions—*

Oujda: Colonel Thuere.
Rabat: Colonel Qurix.
Casablanca: General de Langlade.

Within the military regions, the Commander is both G.O.C. Troops and Prefect: he has two deputies, one responsible for military and one for civil affairs, though the latter may again be a soldier. Each individual region is broken down further into territoires, cercles, circonscriptions, annexes and postes, at the head of each of which is a representative, whether civilian or military, of the Native Affairs Bureau. At every level throughout the administration one finds the French officer or civilian working through the sheik or caid who is the representative of the Sultan—and who in certain cases, such as the judiciary holds his own courts.

Control of the administration of the country is in the hands of personnel recruited into the Native Affairs Bureau.

(1) Not printed.

Some, in fact the majority, are army officers seconded for varying periods; others are civilians recruited by that branch of the French Foreign Office responsible for native affairs in the Protectorate. Many of these officers have spent their lives in Morocco and they are on the whole an impressive lot. They are conscious of fine achievements and though, somewhat naturally, continued service in the same country tends to make them perhaps narrow-minded, they are competent and thoroughly understand their job. It is a fine training ground and offers unusual opportunities for a young man who finds himself entirely responsible for an area as big as an English county.

I had been warned by our consul-general at Rabat that Morocco was the last refuge of the Vichy clique and that I might expect to find a number of real diehard Vichy-ites. In fact I was pleasantly surprised because, although I met some sympathy for General Nogues's policy from the many senior French officers who never heard a shot fired except in the two days after the Casablanca landing in 1942, I also came across many others who fought through the Italian and French campaigns with Moroccan troops. Naturally enough one must make allowances for those who never got out of Morocco and it often took some little time to thaw men who were understandably somewhat on the defensive and others who are prone to remember Mers el Kebir, Dakar and Syria, particularly the latter, which still causes resentment. In fact no one can say we are popular in Morocco or the Americans either. I doubt if British or American capital would be welcome and there is an abiding suspicion of our motives in Cyrenaica.

6. Final Thoughts

I found only a grudging appreciation of the need for educating the native to take a greater share in the government of the country. The reason always produced was the incapability of the North African native and in spite of taking a great deal of high-sounding nonsense the French are looking twenty-five years ahead and not ten. Morocco is far too useful to France to-day to be granted independence and French attitude can best be deduced by the frequency with which senior commanders spoke of the need to dominate the native population. General Juin's views on native policy were naturally echoed by his subordinates whenever I broached the question.

In general then it struck me that though the native appears contented and the country well run, the present policy is to keep him down rather than educate him up. Any conversation on policy always brought up references to the necessity for a strong army in Morocco, to the fact that there were a million Frenchmen in North Africa, of whom 300,000 were in Morocco, and that there was a fundamental difference between their position in Morocco and ours in India: in other words, every reasonable excuse to let things take their time, confident in their power to dictate the speed at which nationalism should move forward.

Morocco is a closely and jealously guarded preserve; the French require no advice as to how to run their affairs and I was conscious of distinct coolness whenever I ventured to make any quite ordinary observation that might be remotely construed as criticism—whatever the subject matter. We are undoubtedly slightly suspect in that by our attitude towards other Arab countries we have tended to increase French difficulties in Morocco.

However much one can admire those officers and civilians responsible for the planning and execution of native policy (and in general they are a fine body of men, seeking only the betterment of the country), one is forced to conclude that their views tend to be narrow, their outlook on world affairs too circumscribed and I shall be very surprised if in five to ten years' time France does not have to adopt a more enlightened policy and that very much quicker than she intended.

7. Armed Forces in Morocco

The army in Morocco is commanded by a general officer with a staff equivalent to a British command in peace, and divided into—

Forces Territoriales, consisting of both metropolitan and colonial units;
Forces d'Intervention, metropolitan units only.

The former consists of three so-called Divisions Territoriales grouped centrally round the big towns of Casablanca, Fez and Meknes, with further troops at brigade strength at Marrakesh. The latter consists of 22nd Infantry Division, which came officially into existence as an independent formation only on 1st April, 1950, at the same time as the dissolution was announced of the collection of three existing Groupements Independents; in fact, the units remain the same, merely the name of the formation headquarters has changed.

A complete Order(1) of Battle on Territorial Lines is attached at Appendix "B." Units of the 22nd Intervention Division are marked in red.

For discipline and administration *all* units and formations come directly under command of the local territorial commander.

Responsibility for training 22nd Infantry Division is in the hands of its own commander. For employment in aid of the civil power or for any other reason within Morocco in time of peace, all units including those of 22nd Infantry Division come under command of the territorial commander, according to instructions received from G.O.C., Morocco.

The armed forces have two principal tasks:—

(*a*) To provide reinforcements for Indo-China.
(*b*) To maintain order in the country.

Under (*a*) above, thirteen infantry battalions were sent to Indo-China in 1949 alone; the result has been that all Moroccan regiments are now composed of two battalions, the third being always in the Far East. General Duval told me that it was intended gradually to create an additional twenty-seven battalions in North Africa, and steps to this effect are already being taken with the formation of the 5th and 7th Tirailleurs Marocains in the near future.

The real task is the maintenance of order and nothing could have brought it more forcibly to my notice than my visit with General Leblanc to the Foreign Legion in some new barracks situated on high ground just outside the town of Fez. Not only he, but every senior officer, to whom I spoke in the course of the day, kept on hammering in the fact that the barracks commanded the town and that troops were tactically well placed to intervene anywhere in Fez (which is, of course, the most likely centre of dissension in the Protectorate), and that whoever held Fez held Morooco.

Responsibility for the maintenance of order devolves on the troops in the following order once the situation has got beyond the control of the civil police:—

Garde Républicaine Mobile, who would be used in support of the police quite early on. If this fails they call on—

Goums;
Foreign Legion;
Senegalese, and lastly
Moroccans;

in that order.

The Senegalese units are garrisoned in Morocco with one specific purpose—action in aid of the civil power. They are unlikely ever to form part of any divisions overseas. Between them and Moroccans there is a lively hatred and I was informed that their of France was largely instrumental in preventing the Moroccan insurrection which was greatly feared and which might well have put paid to the French authority in the country.

8. General Duval's Views

General Duval, G.O.C. all troops in Morocco, was kindness itself in asking me to stay with him and in helping me in every way. His Service de Matériel also did a wonderful job in repairing my car which was badly damaged in a collision with a lorry; I took to him at once; he has only just taken over from being G.O.C., Tunisia, and is an old Moroccan Tirailleur, a most active and forceful character and a very keen pilot with his own aeroplane. His outspokenness in private on several occasions really surprised me, but he would not have bothered to say what he did unless it was true. At our first meeting he said that the army in Morocco was in a shocking state; in fact he was extremely worried about it; it had been milked for Indo-China, thirteen battalions had left the country in 1949 and the strength in Morocco was dangerously low; there was a serious shortage of n.c.os, the equipment was appalling and in short supply with practically no reserves: above all it was impossible to produce a properly trained soldier in a year and until this was remedied and the period of service lengthened to eighteen months there would be no major improvement. He said that the existing divisional organisation meant nothing, since none of the divisions had any services, had done no higher training and had practically no artillery. He thought that discipline was poor; he was doing his best, but it was a depressing task and until all the above were remedied and a higher scale of pay for n.c.os was agreed, which could induce them to join the army, there would be no progress.

General Duval is a man of great determination who is widely respected for his action in 1945 in suppressing the rising in Algeria. The evident pleasure with which some officers spoke of this action brought to my mind the ruthless way in which the French dealt with Syria: they will stand no nonsense in Morocco either and if trouble should break out it would be just as ruthlessly suppressed.

(1) Not printed.

9. Units and Formation Headquarters Visited

I visited the following headquarters and units:—

G.O.C. French Forces in Morocco.
All divisional commanders.
31 Engineer Regiment.
6 Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains.
3 Régiment de Spahis Marocains.
12 Légion Garde Républicaine.
2 Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains.
66 Goums.
4 Régiment de la Légion Etrangère.
4 Régiment de Spahis Marocains.
6 Régiment de Tirailleurs Sénégalais.
63 Régiment d'Artillerie.
1 Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains.
12 Régiment de Chasseurs d'Afrique.
Moroccan Junior Officers' School, Meknes.
Remount Depot, Tamara.

Most of these visits took the best part of half a day or more and in default of any training one was forced to do the inevitable round of barrack rooms, kitchens, &c., descriptions of which would tend to be excessively boring. I shall therefore limit myself to general observations and to descriptions of particular aspects of units that are worthy of special mention.

4th Regiment Foreign Legion

This regiment is organised, armed and equipped on identical lines with any other French infantry regiment. There are only two battalions in Morocco, the third being in Indo-China.

This particular regiment, and I was informed that this was a general guide, is composed of:—

30 per cent. Germans.
20 per cent. Hungarians.
15 per cent. Poles.
Remainder Czechs, Russians, Norwegians, &c.

No Frenchman is permitted to join under a French name. There are no American or British personnel serving.

The battalion strength was 36 officers and 680 men. It was formed up in line with band for my inspection and then marched past; it made an impressive appearance on parade, having lately come back from Indo-China where it appears from this and other units I visited that the ratio of awards for bravery is remarkably high. The C.O. told me there was never any lack of volunteers for Indo-China in this or any other Moroccan regiment—Goums particularly —since they saved money and got considerable extra duty pay while on active service.

Service is for five years with re-engagement permitted for a total of fifteen years; beyond only in exceptional cases. Pay, 4,000 fr. per month minimum rate.

All officers and long-service n.c.os are Frenchmen—volunteers who have mostly been with the Legion for many years.

I was informed that discipline is strict, which is obvious enough, but there is very little crime and no longer any need for what used to be called the penal battalions Recruiting is bad. The majority of the Germans in the Legion will be completing their five years' service this year and it is doubtful whether they will now wish to continue since conditions in Germany are so much better. In 1946 and 1947 a number of Russians enlisted (not White Russians) including some deserters from the Red army. I asked the C.O. whether in the past two years the communisation of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Balkan countries had resulted in a very large increase in recruits from the satellite countries. To my surprise he replied that on the contrary recruiting had practically ceased from these countries.

There are in all seventeen battalions of the Foreign Legion, the depôt of which is at Sidi Bel Abbes in Algeria. Distribution is as follows:—

Morocco: 2, plus 1 mobile groupement on Sahara border.
Madagascar: 1.
Algeria: 3.
Tunis: 2.
Indo-China: 8 (1 parachute, 2 cavalry, 5 infantry).

Arms and equipment were dreadful old stuff, but, I was informed, are only used for parade purposes and are changed when the unit proceeds on active service in Indo-China.

Period of service overseas is three years. Complete battalions sent only. One battalion changes each year.

63 Artillery Regiment

Two Groupes each of two troops of four very old German 105-mm. guns (museum pieces). Included in the regiment is a Groupe of seventy-five mountain guns at Taza.

Strength:—

46 officers.
600 French.
280 Moroccan.

Equipment and M.T. in a terrible state and quite unfit for war.

Etablissement Hippique de Transition, Tamara

This is the only remount depôt in Morocco with an establishment of 4 officers, 11 n.c.os and 80 locally engaged native personnel. It obtains horses and mules either by purchase or from civilian stud farms, one of which I saw later at Meknes. The type of horse is the Anglo-Arab, a sturdy little animal about 15·2 hands. In the armed forces in Morocco there are 3,000 mules and 2,100 horses and though there are no horsed units, most regiments have a few specially for draft or for riding purposes, being the left-overs from the now motorised Spahis and Chasseurs d'Afrique.

Goums

I visited No. 66 Goum at Ain Leuh and was made an honorary member and presented with appropriate uniform. The Goums are independent Berber units and found only in Morocco: they have a remarkable war record as anyone who served in Italy during the latter stages of the war, or read Eric Linklater's book "Private Angelo" will remember. There are in all 25 Goums plus 9 in Indo-China, some independent, some organised into "Tabors," which consist of three Goums; for purposes of higher organisation, three "Tabors" can make a "Rassemblement" or "Groupe," but this is not normal in Morocco. Though a military unit they are not borne on the defence budget paid for by France, but are carried on the books of the Direction de l'Intérieur in Morocco. They are dispersed all over the country, frequently in very inaccessible places.

The main objects of retaining them are:—

(*a*) To maintain order in case of need.
(*b*) To keep in touch with local opinion.
(*c*) As an information centre.

Their *Establishment* is as follows:—

1 officer
6 N.C.O.s } French

126 Goumiers, who are all ex-soldiers and mountaineers, are recruited initially for one year and may continue for successive periods of one year up to a total of 15 years; it is very rare indeed for a man once he has joined not to complete his 15 years. Pay: 6,000 francs a month, accommodated with their families free but not rationed.

Most of these Goums are in new and very smart barracks though the outside of those I saw was a good deal better than the inside.

Organisation and Equipment

Headquarters: 6 men.
3 Rifle Companies: each of 30.
1 Support Company: 30 men.
1 Jeep. No Signals. No. M.T.

Armament of Rifle Company:—
6 T.S.M.s.
3 L.M.G.s.
21 Rifles.

Armament of Support Company:—
2 Hotchkiss M.M.G.s.
2 60-mm. Mortars.
14 Mules.

Ammunition:—
M.M.G. Hotchkiss 10,000 rounds per gun.
Mortars 50 rounds per gun.

31 Engineer Regiment

The only Engineer unit in Morocco. The strength is:—

Officers—	
White	39
N.C.O.s—	
White	90
Native	31
Other Ranks—	
French Conscript ...	739
Native	439
French Volunteer ...	28

This unit is below strength. A first-class C.O. who gave the impression of being a thoroughly good unit, but very short of white personnel and in consequence deficiencies made up of natives (only recently), which is being done increasingly in Morocco. This used to be 100 per cent. white. There is a serious shortage of every sort of equipment and what there was was miserably old stuff of pre-war vintage. Unit has no modern M.T. at all and is so short of petrol that it has a number of mules instead for draft purposes. There is no reserve material whatever. The *pièce de resistance* of this unit is its model farm, since the C.O. found that the 99 francs given him per day to feed his men was insufficient. It struck me that the battalion was more occupied and interested in its farm than in anything else.

12 Légion Garde Republicaine Mobile

Organised in H.Q. and 4 Companies, one each at Rabat, Casablanca, Fez and Marrakesh. This is a first-class unit, whose primary duty is the maintenance of public

order, 100 per cent. volunteer, all white, composed entirely of long service personnel. Each company contains one platoon of 8 Renault F 35 Armoured Cars, each armed with one 37 mm. gun and one 7·62 M.M.G., the remainder of the platoon being carried in trucks. Company War Establishment: 4 officers, 120 men.

1 *Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains*

A first class unit. Guard of Honour of 100 men with band and drums, every one of whom were decorated with Croix de Guerre: a most impressive parade. There was considerable difficulty owing to various stages of training and two lots of recruits, but a fine lot of men.

4 *Régiment de Spahis*

A mixed regiment—15 per cent. Moroccan—at very low strength (23 officers and 250 other ranks). It is a popular regiment for French volunteers, which accounts for its low strength, the form being that volunteers proceed overseas to Indo-China on completion of four months' service. A large draft had just left. Equipment again terribly old—Panhard armoured cars and pre-war half tracks, German M.M.G.s, American mortars, French L.M.G.s, but in first-class order and a very high-class unit.

12 *Régiment de Chasseurs d'Afrique*

Now organised as three squadrons of M5 light tanks. Hitherto it was one squadron light tanks and two squadrons semi-track. No arrangements in hand for this regiment to expand on mobilisation but has full equipment available in mobilisation store. Light tanks worn out. A fine unit which fought in Leclerc's Division and spent many months in England in 1943–44.

6 *Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains*

A very indifferent unit. Strength:—

36 Officers, of whom 5 Moroccan.
1,325 O.R.s Native.
250 French or annual contingent.
32 Warrant Officers (White).

The armament of the Regimental Support Company consisted of:—

4 German 20 mm. A.A. guns.
4 German M.M.G.s.
4 Brandt 80 mm. mortars.

The carbines in service in lieu of rifles appear to be of Crimean vintage, as did most of the soldiers' clothing. General Duval had warned me beforehand that the unit wanted a good shake up.

10. Recruiting

There have always been a certain number of junior native officers, but hitherto I should say insufficient; the French have made much slower progress than we did in India. There are normally an average of five per Moroccan native regiment; I believe there are only four native majors in the whole of Morocco, the rest being junior officers and not promoted after completing fifteen years' service. Recently they have asked for and been given identical statute with French officers as regards terms of service and opportunities of advancement, the first Lieut.-Colonel is shortly to be promoted, and an increase in number of native officers of all ranks is to be encouraged. French senior officers complain that for one good there are always four bad, and that they cannot all be given responsibility. Personally it struck me that they had made little effort to educate them militarily; none for instance are ever sent to French military schools.

All Moroccan soldiers are volunteers. They enlist initially for four years and thereafter take on for one year until reaching a maximum of fifteen years. Desertion is unknown.

The method of native recruiting is interesting. When a regiment falls considerably below strength the C.O. gets permission to recruit to bring him up to W.E. provided, of course, the proportion of coloured to white is not exceeded. Most regiments have their own particular areas for recruiting, or if not are told where they can recruit from. An officer is then sent into the mountains and told to return with the requisite number of men. In the case of 63 Artillery Regiment which had just completed a recruiting drive 1,100 recruits were obtained in three weeks, out of whom 200 were selected, and this is the case I understand in every other unit. There is never any shortage of recruits. Not only is the burden of instruction very heavy and complicated, but one of the results is quite clearly that it would be rare for any unit to be fit for war without the intake of a considerable number of reservists.

11. Moroccan Officers' School

I visited this school which is located at Dar el Beida, just outside Meknes, in a lovely old palace near the Government stud farm and commanded by Colonel De St. Bon, an old "Affaires Indigènes" officer who has spent his life in Morocco. Unfortunately both he and most of the students were away on a visit. I have already indicated that there is some appreciation in the highest quarters of the need for an increase in the number of young educated Moroccans capable of taking their place in the army or in Government Civil Service. This school has hitherto trained officers only: its capacity and programme have been extended and it now caters for the following:—

(*a*) Preliminary training for young men of 12–17 years of age with a carefully-chosen background and who are likely to train on as good administrators. The training is essentially military, much on the lines of our Duke of York's School. Total of 80 boys.
(*b*) On completion of this part of the programme students then continue for a further two years to be trained as either—
Elèves officiers or Elèves administrateurs.
25 students in each.

As regards the first, on completion of their course they are nominated at 2/Lts. Aspirants in Moroccan Regiments where they do eighteen months' probation before being confirmed in their rank which is then post-dated.

In the case of Elèves administrateurs, on completion of their course they are attached for two years to a "cercle" or "bureau" under an experienced French officer before being given employment in the Bureau des Affaires Indigènes. This is an entirely new departure and the first course has only just started.

12. General Observations on French Forces in Morocco

It has generally been believed that the forces in Morocco are composed of better class units, all of a higher standard of training than those in the Metropole itself; this would also imply at least an equally good standard of armament and equipment and presumably also a greater degree of readiness for war: this is not the case.

As will be seen from the Order of Battle, the greater part of the units have their base in Morocco; the fighting value of the Moroccan is known to be high and his appearance, physique and turnout is impressive. I would not, however, say that these Moroccan units units were the equal of a first-class Indian battalion.

It is only fair to say, however, that the standard of C.O.s was very high and that practically every native soldier had war service either in the late war or in Indo-China.

Hitherto native regiments have been composed entirely of native personnel with a leavening of French officers and N.C.O.s. Similarly regiments like Zouaves and Chasseurs d'Afrique were white. To-day for various reasons, generally connected with shortage of white personnel, all this has changed. There is no all-white or all-black unit in Morocco. Every regiment of whatever sort and of whatever arm contains the following:—

(*a*) French officers and long-service N.C.O.s.
(*b*) Part of the French annual contingent doing its twelve months' military service.
(*c*) Native officers.
(*d*) Native long-service personnel—all volunteers.

There are difficulties enough already for most commanding officers in the French Army in units where personnel is purely white with its normal bi-annual intake of recruits. In Morocco there is now superimposed the additional difficulty of there being always a proportion of native recruits under instruction. Training must be a major headache.

What is particularly noticeable is the poor quality of the rearmament and equipment in service, all of which is very old and much quite unserviceable. In addition owing to the constant demands for drafts for Indo-China, little higher training beyond battalion level has been attempted and it is therefore safe to say that none of the units in Morocco, including those in the 22nd Intervention Division, are fit for war at the moment.

JF 1018/29 No. 12

SUMMER SESSION OF THE CONSEIL DU GOUVERNEMENT

Mr. Consul Fladgate to Mr. Younger. (*Received* 18*th July*)

(No. 20) *Rabat,*
Sir, 1*st July*, 1950.

I have the honour to inform you that the Summer Session of the Conseil du Gouvernement opened in Rabat on 26th June.

2. For several days previous to the opening, rumours had been rife that this meeting would be one of particular interest. It was said that the Moroccan franc would be divorced from the French franc with corresponding freedom of exchange. Also that the present regulations on imports and exports would be considerably relaxed. However, these expectations came to nought. The speeches of the Resident-General followed the usual trend, and these particular questions were not referred to by him. There was no reference made this time to the vexed question of the treaties.

3. There was a considerable amount of business on the agenda and, at one time, it was feared that the session would drag on over its three days. However, the opening coincided with a heat-wave which was also accompanied by the disagreeable *chergui* (a hot wind which produces a feeling of being enveloped in wet warm cotton wool). The session completed its business on time. As Ramadan, the Mohammedan fast-month, had begun some ten days before this session, the Moroccan meeting will not meet until the second fortnight of this month.

4. In his opening address, General Juin paid homage to the Sultan, drew attention to the position Morocco must occupy in the Western world. "It has," he said, "to be acknowledged that the maintenance of security and peace, which is to-day the principle problem of all nations, can no longer be assured except through the complete co-operation of many united Powers, where each are willing to renounce their animosities and even a little of their individuality and sovereignty. In this respect, Morocco cannot be kept apart from the Western European Group, and to this effect, the French Government have just recently shown a bold initiative which, it is hoped, will be followed in the interests of peace."

5. Turning to the economic problems, the general touched upon the supplementary budget, which was submitted for approval. (This formed the subject of my despatch No. 19 of 26th June, 1950.) He reviewed the work that had been done during the six months since the last session.

6. Agriculture had been severely affected by the drought of last spring, and credits will be necessary to assist farmers until the next harvest. It is intended to better the existing conditions of workers. Commercial conditions generally had improved, and the adverse trade balance of imports over exports for the first five months of the year was 4½ milliard less than for the corresponding period of 1949.

7. The Resident-General said that the first year of the four-year plan had surpassed expectations in so far as agriculture, mining, hydraulic works and public construction were concerned.

8. With regard to problems of housing, social insurance and cost of living, General Juin gave figures of the sums already expended for building houses, and added that private construction would be encouraged by loans and rent legalisation. The present social insurance system was being examined with a view to the betterment of allowances for children, particularly for their education. There would be no cessation of efforts to combat the increasing cost of living.

9. General Juin concluded his speech by saying: "It is absolutely essential that every Government protects those Administrations for whom they are responsible, not only against abuse of freedom, but also against the danger, so much more threatening to-day, of seeing the individual giving up his essential rights to a State which has betrayed his trust, or to organisations which have become stronger than the State. The stakes are worth while. In so far as Governments, guided by public opinion, which you represent here, can still understand the existing situation and act accordingly, then all peoples may, in a world perhaps a little more difficult but with an assurance of peace, enjoy their intellectual and material accomplishments."

10. The rest of the day was taken up with the report of the Director of Finance, who presented his supplementary budget, and the debate which followed on this and the general financial situation. For the successful furtherance of the four-year plan, it was urged that a large loan be launched, not only internally but externally. This proposal was not well received by the Director of Finance, who said such a loan might lay a heavy burden on the country.

11. The following day, the meeting opened peacefully with a debate on the economic situation. It was urged that the Government should assist exporters and lighten the present system of licensing which is intolerably cumbersome and tedious. Uneasiness was expressed over the continued export of wheat, which, it was feared, would increase the price of bread and lead to greater poverty. The Director of Agriculture said that measures had been taken and there was no fear that there would be any increase in price or corresponding ill-effects. A sharp dispute then blew up over the question of the price of water to the farmers, on whose behalf it was claimed they were charged too much.

12. The afternoon session was occupied by a discussion on the activities of the *Paysannat*, always a very vexed question, the installation of frigorificos in various parts of the country, artificial insemination, the fight against the cost of living, and finally the cuts in water and electricity which are now in force and have been rendered necessary by the drought and the lack of competent hydraulic planning. (Water is now cut off every day for a period varying from seven to twelve hours according to the district, and electricity is cut twice a week for corresponding periods.)

13. On 29th June, the last day of the French session, the Public Works Department came under fire. Rural electrification, secondary roads, transportation, ports, aviation, were all energetically discussed. This Department is a favourite target, and no opportunity to pillory it is allowed to pass.

14. The afternoon was very hot, and there was little energy with which to discuss the last items on the agenda, which were mostly local questions. Eventually, all the business was completed and then the delegates, through Dr. Eyraud, Rapporteur-General, passed a vote of confidence in the Resident-General.

15. In his brief closing reply, General Juin thanked them for their friendly gesture and expressed himself as grateful for the support given by the members of the Administration. He hoped that the present international situation would improve and expressed his satisfaction at the firm attitude taken against the aggressors.

16. I am sending copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Cairo; His Majesty's Consuls-General at Tangier, Tunis, Algiers and Tetuan, and His Majesty's Consuls at Casablanca and Fez.

I have, &c.
C. FLADGATE.

JF 1023/2 No. 13

THE SULTAN OF MOROCCO'S VISIT TO FRANCE

Mr. Hayter to Mr. Bevin. (*Received* 24*th October*)

(No. 579. Restricted) *Paris,*
Sir, 20*th October*, 1950.

I have the honour to report that on 8th October the Sultan of Morocco arrived at Bordeaux on the French cruiser *Georges-Leygues* to pay an official visit to France, accompanied by his eldest son, Prince Moulay Hassan, and members of his court.

2. This was the first time for five years that the Sultan had visited France, and the publicity and ceremonial arrangements were on an impressive scale. The Sultan stayed at the Palais de l'Elysée in Paris as the guest of the President, and went through the usual intense programme offered to visitors of his importance. He laid a wreath on the Unknown Soldier's Tomb at the Arc de Triumphe, was given dinners at the Elysée, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Hotel de Ville, attended the Motor Show and the Horse Show and shot pheasants at Marly. The public of Paris were mildly interested by these manifestations. Barring a few incidents at Bordeaux there were no disturbances to mar the visit.

3. The visit comes at a time when questions of North African emancipation are a live issue in France. The forthcoming independence of Libya and events in Tunisia, with the replacement of M. Mons by M. Périllier and the attendant discussions of reform in that country, centred

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interest on the political significance of the visit. The Sultan himself had intimated his desire to discuss Franco-Moroccan relations with the President and with members of the Government, and had added that he had no doubt that these conversations would have satisfactory results given the sincere friendship of the two countries. Nevertheless, it was well recognised that the Sultan's desiderata went a good deal further than anything that General Juin had yet proposed or felt able to offer, and certain sections of the French press had bewailed the way in which the Sultan had been " spoiled " during the Anglo-American occupation of North Africa. The official attitude has been that France and Morocco have a long road to go together. While results hitherto obtained have been satisfactory, there remains much to be done, and it would be a disaster for the West were the present reasonably harmonious relations to be disturbed. In this context the United States attitude has been criticised from time to time in the press, notably in *Le Monde*.

4. No indication has yet been given of the result of any conversation the Sultan may have had. There has been ample opportunity for discussions at which General Juin will no doubt have been present. It was rumoured that the Sultan had sought, but failed to obtain, conversations with the President and members of the Government at which the Resident-General would not be present. General Juin has now left on a mission of enquiry in Indo-China, and the Sultan is prolonging his stay in a private capacity in a villa at Neuilly. It is possible that he may avail himself of the remainder of his visit to press for further conversations.

5. I am copying this despatch to His Majesty's Representatives at Rabat, Tangier, Tunis and Algiers.

I have, &c.

W. G. HAYTER.

JF 1023/4 No. 14

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND THE SULTAN OF MOROCCO

Sir O. Harvey to Mr. Bevin. (Received 14th November)

(No. 612. Confidential) *Paris,*
Sir, *11th November*, 1950.

With reference to my despatch No. 579 of 20th October, I have the honour to report that the Sultan of Morocco returned to North Africa on 6th November.

2. There has been much speculation on the result of the Sultan's discussions with the French Government on the reform of relations between the two countries, which was one of the avowed objects of his visit. A member of my staff has been given the following account of the negotiations by M. Binoche, the head of the African Department of the Quai d'Orsay.

3. The first memorandum handed to the French by the Sultan on his arrival was couched in general terms and appeared to criticise the manner in which the Treaty of Fez was being applied rather than the actual terms of the treaty itself. The memorandum stated that there was too much direct administration and that it was important not to forget that the ultimate aim was the independence of Morocco. Annexed to the memorandum was a list of specific complaints ranging from quite trivial incidents to more substantial matters such as education, the nomination of certain sheikhs and censorship.

4. The French in their reply had recalled the state of chaos in which they found Morocco in 1912 and pointed out that in a comparatively short time they had done much to bring order and prosperity to the country. They agreed that sufficient progress had been made to warrant starting on a new phase during which responsibility could increasingly be handed over to local democratic institutions. As regards the Sultan's specific complaints, the French readily agreed to abolish censorship and to meet other minor requests, and proposed that the remainder should be considered by a joint commission to be set up in Rabat, consisting of three Frenchmen and three Moroccans, which would submit recommendations to the Sultan and the French Resident-General.

5. Two days before his departure the Sultan had sent a further memorandum couched in even friendlier terms than the first in which he said he was sorry that the true meaning of his first memorandum had not been understood. What he wanted was the end of the protectorate and the replacement of the Treaty of Fez by a new treaty of friendship. He went on to express his disappointment with the French note and expressed his hope and belief that the French would come to share his point of view in time.

6. M. Binoche said that opinions differed at the Quai d'Orsay as to the true significance of these exchanges. The view was held that there were divided counsels around the Sultan which accounted for the inconsistency in the Sultan's behaviour. He himself, however, believed that everything had gone exactly as the Sultan expected. The Sultan could hardly have believed that it was possible during his three weeks in Paris to settle so complex and vast a matter as the replacement of the Treaty of Fez by another international instrument. M. Binoche thought therefore that the Sultan had simply asked in his first memorandum for what he thought he could get. Having got it, he then sent in the second note to put himself right with nationalist opinion in Morocco which might otherwise have criticised him for selling himself to the French.

7. M. Binoche implied that the visit was not going to entail any startling change in French policy. The Joint Commission would be set up and would report in due course and the French would continue progressively to introduce the locals into the administration and seek to build up the institutions of a western democratic State. Here it was, he said, that he foresaw the main source of trouble for the Sultan. The recent visit had brought out clearly that the Sultan and the French Government saw the future in rather different terms. The Sultan was thinking in terms of an oriental despotism in which all power would be centred in himself; whereas the French were thinking in terms of responsible democratic institutions, to whom they would hand over power.

8. In reply to a question M. Binoche said that he thought that the French Government would not take up the idea of a declaration about their intentions. There had already been too many declarations. France would continue along the path of trying to fit the Moroccans for self-government. It remained to be seen whether, in the time during which they remained in control—and here M. Binoche mentioned " ten to fifteen, or twenty, years " which he said was a phrase used in the Sultan's memorandum—the French would be successful in leaving a firm enough imprint on the country to save it from lapsing once more into chaos and corruption.

9. M. Binoche added that, while he hoped that Tunis and Morocco would remain closely associated with France, he did not think that they wish to enter the French Union because they would not desire to be associated with the other component parts. Morocco and Tunis might accept links with with France similar to those provided for the French Union but would not be prepared to share such links with other French African, American or Asian possessions. He agreed that the French Union's present form was unfortunately rigid and that some new form of association would be needed to meet the case of these two States.

10. Accounts in the press, by those who claim to be in close touch with the Sultan's entourage, have presented a picture of greater disappointment on the Sultan's part at the result of his visit, but I should judge that the account given by M. Binoche is substantially accurate. Rumours of the replacement of General Juin as Resident-General have died down, and French officials have recently gone out of their way to emphasise that there is no question of his going—on North African political grounds at least.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Rabat, Tangiers, Tunis and Algiers.

I have, &c.

OLIVER HARVEY.

JF 1023/6 No. 15

THE SULTAN OF MOROCCO'S DISCUSSIONS IN PARIS

Consul-General Sir C. Cane to Mr. Bevin. (Received 22nd November)

(No. 34. Confidential) *Rabat,*
Sir, *16th November, 1950.*

I have the honour to refer to my semi-official letter of 18th October to Mr. Bendall, concerning the visit of His Majesty the Sultan of Morocco to Paris, and the outcome of his discussions with M. Auriol, President of France, the President of the Council and the Foreign Minister of France.

2. I have been fortunate enough to obtain the entire history of the negotiations from the Sultan himself, from his eldest son,

Prince Moulay Hassan, and the Principal Minister of the Sultan's new Cabinet, Si Ahmed Bahnini, through the intermediary of a British author, Mr. Rom Landau, an old friend of mine, who happens to be staying in Rabat collecting material for a new book. I feel sure that he was given this information in order that it should be passed to me. Mr. Landau had one interview with the Sultan when none but Si Ahmed Bahnini was present and acted as interpreter, and two with Prince Moulay Hassan, when no third person was present.

3. The French invited the Sultan to Paris chiefly for reasons of propaganda: to demonstrate to the world the friendship and unity between France and Morocco. Due to this, at first, many Moroccan Nationalists criticised the Sultan for accepting the invitation. The Sultan, however, decided before leaving that he would ask for the revocation of the terms of the Protectorate Treaty of 1912. His Majesty and his closest advisers considered that since 1912 conditions both in Morocco and in the world at large, have altered considerably, and that the 1912 Treaty no longer met the demands of the times. Even if he failed to convince the French, he wished to state clearly before the whole world that he considered the treaty as an inadequate and outdated basis for Franco-Moroccan relations.

4. The conversations between the Sultan and the French, (Messrs. Auriol, Pleven and Schuman), were most cordial. The Sultan, who was alone, explained that he considered the 1912 Treaty outdated and wished to see the creation of a new frame-work for Franco-Moorish relations, in fact the essential point was, that a new treaty be signed, the details of which could be discussed later. The French seemed to meet the Sultan's suggestions sympathetically. They agreed that the moment had come for reconsidering the old treaty and asked the Sultan to put down his proposals in a memorandum. This the Sultan did, and his Grand Vizir, a remarkable old man of 95, who signed the 1912 Treaty in the same capacity, presented it a few days later.

5. Meanwhile in Morocco, rumours had spread that the old treaty was to be replaced by a new one and the Elysée and Quai d'Orsay were bombarded with telegrams from French residents in Morocco (" colons "), who declared that revocation of the treaty would mean utter ruin to French interests in Morocco. Two prominent protectorate officials were sent to Paris post haste together with one of the leading " colons." The Sultan states categorically that the two officials from Rabat were entrusted with the preparation of the answer to his memorandum which, His Majesty further asserts, was not seen by M. Schuman, who was at the time in Italy. The answer completely reversed the promises given the Sultan by Messrs. Auriol, Pleven and Schuman; a change of the treaty of 1912 could not even be contemplated and was quite unnecessary as it left enough room *était suffisamment souple* for any requisite reforms. Among the reforms that the French were willing to consider were: Abolishment of censorship, erection of trade unions, permission for the Sultan to nominate Pashas and Kaids; but this was nullified by insistence on the Resident-General retaining his right of veto, and legal reforms.

6. The Sultan was almost stunned by this unexpected reply which contradicted everything he had been promised in his personal talks with the French leaders. He prepared a second memorandum, in which he reiterated his original thesis, adding that individual reforms were of little interest to Morocco so long as the old Protectorate Treaty formed the basis of Franco-Moorish relations. Once again, he insisted that a new treaty be prepared.

7. The second memorandum evoked no response from the French. Instead, the Sultan was informed that the French would appoint a mixed-commission, which was to prepare the promised minor reforms mentioned in paragraph 5. But no mention was made as to who the French members of such a commission would be, nor to its terms of reference.

8. The Sultan left Paris without replying to the French suggestion. He is, however, determined not to accept the Mixed-Commission, in order to avoid creating a precedent. He refuses to acknowledge that such reforms can be of benefit to Morocco so long as his country remains completely dependent upon France. He insists that first and foremost the Treaty of 1912 must be revoked.

9. Though the Sultan and his advisers consider they have been deceived (" déçus "), they do not regard their visit to France as a failure. For the first time, the Sultan has made it clear beyond all doubt that all Morocco considers the Treaty of 1912 outdated and that from now on, all efforts will

be directed towards its replacement by one meeting more adequately the changed conditions of the times and the aspirations of the Moroccan people.

10. There seems little doubt that the French action has helped to consolidate the views of the Sultan's advisers. It was, I understand, a severe shock to them, and especially to General Juin, when the Grand Vizir himself presented the memoranda and in no uncertain terms allied himself with the Sultan's viewpoint. He has always been considered a willing tool of the French.

11. It seems unlikely that any disturbances will follow upon the failure of the negotiations. Both the Sultan and the Nationalist leaders say they can be patient, and they seem convinced that the march of world events will eventually force the French to accede to Moorish demands. Furthermore, they are fully aware, and the armistice parades at which every available soldier and piece of mechanised equipment was produced, was an obvious warning to any hotheads, that trouble would be ruthlessly and, if necessary, bloodily repressed. I am sure that General Juin would have no compunction in using whatever force was necessary to keep order. He has, on many occasions, told my colleagues and myself that while he is Resident-General he will keep order at any price.

12. The leaders in Moorish politics express themselves as sad and disillusioned *triste et désillusionné* that the British and Americans show so little understanding of Moorish aspirations and support unwaveringly French policy. They are particularly disappointed about the apparent attitude of Great Britain because they believe that, while Americans have little or no understanding of either the French or Moorish character, the British have long personal experience of the working of the French and Arab mind. They even go so far as to maintain that Britain disregards Moorish aspirations and supports French policy in Morocco because it is her traditional policy to support in North Africa the weakest Power, and a weakening of French prestige in Morocco might mean a dangerous increase in American power in that country!

13. According to reliable reports, on his return from France, the Sultan received the most enthusiastic welcome of the whole of his reign of over twenty years. The French press reported that 100,000 people were present at Casablanca. According to Si Ahmed Bahnini of the Imperial Cabinet, the number was some 300,000. Apparently thousands of his subjects had come from all over the country on horseback, on mules, donkeys and on foot, even many Berbers came from the Middle and High Atlas to salute their King. There were scenes of great enthusiasm at Rabat also.

14. While as late as 1949 pictures of the Sultan would seldom be seen in Marrakesh, the Middle Atlas or the Tafilalit, in the autumn of 1950 such pictures were much more in evidence in the shops and booths of the local markets (souks), and the natives spoke of the Sultan and his eldest son Moulay Hassan, with enthusiasm and affection. There is no doubt that his prestige has increased throughout the country, but it is most evident in the towns and country areas north of the Atlas. The French continue their efforts to undermine that prestige by circulating all kinds of stories about the private life of the Sultan, of his eldest son and even of his unmarried daughter. In fact I have never heard a French person, male or female, say a good word for any member of the reigning family. They often say that they have it within their power to replace him by someone more fitted, *i.e.*, more amenable to French direction, to occupy the throne.

15. Perhaps an almost incredible incident which occurred at Tangier will show to what lengths the French will go to administer pinpricks to the Sultan to lower the prestige of any other countries, particularly Britain, in the eyes of the Sultan. The cruiser *Georges Leygues*, upon which His Majesty was travelling, stopped at Tangier for a few hours. The president and the vice-president of the Tangier Commission who happened to be the American and Belgian Ministers, and naturally the French Minister came on board. The Sultan immediately asked where the British Minister was. He was informed that he had refused to come on board as his demand for a salute of guns could not be aceded to because His Majesty was a board. I telephoned Mr. Stirling immediately, who, of course, said the whole story was a lie. The French Minister had asked the Commission to make the delegation as small as possible, and it had been agreed that only the president and the vice-president of the Commission should go abroad. I have seen that this particular falsehood has been nailed to the mast.

16. The French reverses in Indo-China are discussed gleefully in Nationalist circles, although the losses amongst Moroccan troops are deplored and advanced as one

more reason why the French should change the 1912 Treaty, so that Moroccans can decide whether the lives of their compatriots should be sacrificed or not.

17. There is little doubt that nationalism has flirted with communism, but is doubtful if much advance has been made on either side. The Moors are not blind to Communist imperialism. The French, in order to discredit the Nationalists, make much of the contacts between the two. Its effects should not be discounted entirely, although too much attention should not be paid to it now.

18. The Feast of the Throne (anniversary of His Majesty's accession to the throne), which takes place on 18th November, is eagerly awaited. The Sultan makes a speech to his people, and it is expected that he will make a report on his visit to Paris. It will be interesting to see how much he will divulge on this occasion.

19. As I have stated before, Morocco has practically no trained men to take over the leading positions of government, let alone the lower posts, and if complete independance were to be granted, within a year chaos would soon reign. However, the French do practically nothing to train the Moors, because they are determined to hang on to Morocco until the last, and because they think they are incapable of governing themselves. A number of observers, both foreign and French, see in this tenacity a very grave error which may eventually cost the French very dear.

20. There is very little doubt that, had the French allowed a revision of the 1912 Treaty, the Sultan and his advisers and the majority of the Nationalists would have agreed to a gradual lightening of the Protectorate, until the country would have become self-governing without too much friction. As it is, there is a sense of injustice which will militate against any real understanding at any time, between the two peoples.

I have, &c.

CYRIL H. CANE.

JF 1018/76 No. 16

FRANCO-MOROCCAN RELATIONS

Attacks on the French Administration by Members of the Deuxième Collège

Consul-General Sir C. Cane to Mr. Bevin. (Received 28th December)

(No. 40) *Rabat,*
Sir, *16th December,* 1950.

With reference to my despatch No. 37 of 4th December reporting on the French Session of the Conseil du Gouvernement, I have the honour to inform you that the Moroccan Session opened on 6th December.

2. There were on this occasion no absentions such as those reported in Rabat letter (41/24/29) to African Department of 24th July; but the 2ème Collège has again been to the fore by reason of vigorous attacks by some of its members on France and the Administration in Morocco.

3. The Moroccan Session always opens with the reading of a translation of the Resident-General's opening speech made to the French Session. Before this took place, General Juin said the last sentence of that part of his speech which dealt with the recent visit of the Sultan to Paris, would appear to contain a reflection on His Majesty. This was, of course, in no way intended, and the offending statement had been deleted from the version now to be read out. (I enclose the relevant extract with the offending passage underlined. In its stead, the following is substituted: " Depuis lors une controverse s'est instituée dans la presse à propos d'une révision immédiate du Traité de 1912.")

4. It is alleged in Moroccan circles that this step was taken on the insistence of the Sultan, who objected most strongly to the original implication. It is reported that he threatened, if not given satisfaction, to instruct the Moroccan délégués to the various departments not to attend the session. In such a case, when the members of the three Collèges presented themselves at the meeting and saw none of their representatives present on the rostrum, they also would withdraw.

5. The session began with M. Lamy, Director of Finances, submitting his report. On the President of the 2ème Collège being called upon for his comments, Si Lyazidi began by saying that the presence of the delegates of his Collège did not mean that they had abandoned their previous attitude towards the Administration. General Juin interrupted him, saying that he considered

the matter to be of small importance and he should proceed with his report. Si Lyazidi said that, as would be seen from his report, he had a good deal more to say on this subject. He then proceeded to read in Arabic. He was again interrupted and told the report must also be read in French. The reading and translation took several hours.

6. The report contained a sustained attack on French policy towards, and French administration in, Morocco. It covered political ground as well as economic and meticulously detailed all the grievances which, it is alleged, had received no redress. On completion of the reading, the Resident-General expressed himself in the strongest terms. " It was," he said, " an entirely unwarranted attack for which there was not the least justification, and moreover, it dealt with matters of policy which were not for discussion, as the speaker was well aware, in this assembly. Furthermore, he spoke neither for the session nor for the country as a whole." Si Lyazidi broke in to say that his accusations were not levelled against France, but only against her policy as pursued in Morocco. General Juin said discussion of policy was between the Sultan and France. He requested Si Lyazidi to refrain from making any more of these polemics during the present session and to confine himself to the business in hand.

7. Certain of the delegates at once dissociated themselves from the report; a few openly supported it, but the majority listened in silence, offering no comments after it had been read.

8. For the next few days, a calmer attitude prevailed. There were, however, frequent sharp exchanges between the delegates and the heads of the various departments, especially over questions very close to Moroccan interest, such as housing, education, care of the *Paysannot*, &c. Each budget was meticulously examined and delegates did not hesitate to express freely their dislike or approval of the reports as submitted to them.

9. A fresh incident occurred on 12th December, when immediately before Si Laghzaoui rose to present his report on the Public Works Department budget, General Juin got up to say that, not only did this report contain the most unjustified insults to France, but had also been given to the press before being read at the session. General Juin reminded the meeting of his words in connexion with Si Lyazidi's report, that this Assembly was not the place for political discussion and he requested Si Laghzaoui to withdraw from the meeting. He did so, accompanied by Si Lyazidi and seven other delegates. The incident was then declared to be closed.

10. The session closed on the following day without any further incidents occurring. When the last business had been completed, several of the delegates rose in turn to express their disapproval at the recent events, and to affirm their trust in France. In his closing oration, the Resident-General thanked those present for their presence and the attention with which they had followed the long debates. General Juin went on to say that, as the delegates were aware, the Conseil du Gouvernement was called for the discussion of economic and financial affairs. It was never intended to be a political meeting, since the question of policy was one only for the Sultan and the French Government to decide. He concluded by saying that at a time when the general peace (of the world) is threatened, useless disturbances should not be created. There was no ill-feeling towards anyone, he continued, but there would be no hesitation in taking all possible steps against any who sought to create disorder, or divide the people against each other. He then shook hands with all the assembled delegates and the session ended.

11. There is little doubt that these disturbances were a direct follow-up of the Sultan's visit to France and an endeavour to keep the Moroccan question in the limelight. The general opinion here is that both sides handled the matter maladroitly. The Moroccans were in the wrong to raise political matters during the conseil, which is called only for the discussion of financial and economic ones, and certainly Si Laghzaoui had no right to publish his report before its having been read in the Assembly. The Moroccan argument may well have been that this was the only chance to air their grievances since the continued and strict censorship precluded any hope of their protests being brought to the notice of the world, or at least to readers of the local press. They were prepared to risk the consequences so long as they got some publicity.

12. The Resident-General's handling of the affair was too much that of the soldier and ruler. He could have been far more suave and equally, if not more, effective. As it is, he has no doubt caused the malcontents to be looked upon in some quarters as martyrs, and thus played their game for them. The whole affair is only worth reporting as showing the temper of the

Moroccans at the present time. At no time before, has the unwritten rule of the conseil been flouted and political matters brought up. Moreover, the whole attitude, even of those delegates who continue to preach moderation and patience, was one of tenseness. As I have stated, every report submitted was meticulously examined and searching questions asked of the various directors. In witness thereof, the conseil sat for eight days, and at times until past midnight, instead of the usual three or three and a half days.

13. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Cairo, His Majesty's Consuls-General at Tangier and Tetuan, and His Majesty's Consuls at Casablanca and Fez.

I have, &c.

CYRIL H. CANE.

Enclosure in No. 16

Copy of Article from Maroc-Presse *of 30th November 1950*

Les Relations franco-marocaines

. . . . Il était dans l'ordre naturel des choses que l'auguste Souverain de ce pays, à l'occasion d'un voyage officiel qui devait lui permettre de mesurer la force de l'amitié française, entretînt le Gouvernement de la République de l'avenir des rapports franco-marocains. A son exposé, empreint, j'en porte témoignage, d'une grande sagesse, le Gouvernement français se devait de répondre comme il l'a fait par une déclaration solennelle et par certaines recommandations portant sur des points précis ne laissant place à aucune équivoque et qui se traduiront prochainement dans les faits. *La controverse ne s'est instituée qu'ensuite et à propos d'une révision du traité de 1912 invoquée après-coup. . . . .*

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

JM 1012/1

No. 17

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN TANGIER

Consul-General Stirling to Mr. Younger. (*Received* 14*th July*)

(No. 86. Confidential) *Tangier,*
Sir, 14*th July,* 1950.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my annual report on leading personalities at Tangier for the year 1950.

I have, &c.

C. N. STIRLING.

Enclosure in No. 17

Report on the Leading Personalities in the Tangier Zone of Morocco

EUROPEANS

1. Aldegunde, Reverend Father Francisco
Spaniard. Franciscan. Succeeded Father Betanzos as Bishop of Tangier and Spanish Morocco with title of Bishop of Fussala. Pleasant middle-aged man who seems broad-minded and friendly. The able and intelligent Padre Lopez continues as his secretary.

2. Apostoli, Giovanni
Italian judge, appointed in succession to Fernando Malmusi, when the latter was revoked on account of his Fascist tendencies in 1945. Apostoli is not a brilliant jurist nor an outstanding personality, but he appears to enjoys a fair reputation for honesty locally.

3. Artous, Louis
French second-in-command of the International Police and virtually in control of it. Was in the resistance movement in France during the war and was imprisoned at Buchenwald. An agreeable and shrewd personality, who effectively presses French interests. It has been rumoured that he is a crypto-Communist but no evidence against him is so far forthcoming.

4. Bastianelli, Auguste
Director of French Public Instruction in Tangier. The institutions he controls cover some 5,000 pupils. Politically he took the line of least resistance through the war. He is an able administrator, but is not well liked by his staff.

5. Cracco, François
Assistant Administrator of Finance. He is the Belgian nominee for that important post, and has acquitted himself with great efficiency and energy. He is a man of too high calibre for the job, and tends to get impatient with the businessmen of Tangier and with the members of the Legislative Assembly in their opposition to any sort of Government interference and control. Many of his ideas are sound but he tries to go too fast. Both M. Cracco and his wife are good socially, and speaking good English, mix freely with the British community. Having made himself unpopular with the Legislative Assembly by his contempt, M. Cracco has now unfortunately earned their suspicion by secretiveness and a reluctance to face criticism.

6. Crambes, Dr.
French Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly, and president of the Anciens Combattants. He is generally regarded as being friendly in his attitude towards us.

7. De los Campos, Villarejo
Spaniard, born about 1900. Procureur of the Mixed Court, a post which he combines with similar functions in Tetuan. Rarely visits Tangier. Has British wife of Gibraltar origin and is believed to be not unfriendly.

8. Ellis, Lieut.-Colonel W. F., C.M.G., O.B.E.
British Vice-President of the Legislative Assembly. Retiring from the R.A.M.C., Colonel Ellis originally came to Tangier over twenty years ago as medical practitioner. He later founded the prosperous firm of Ellis and Co. During the war he was chief of the Press Office and received the C.M.G. in recognition of his work. He is an able and hard-headed business man, with a finger in many Tangier pies and extremely well informed on Tangier subjects, but his views are apt to be coloured by his own personal interest. He is correspondent of the London *Times*. One of the most forceful personalities in Tangier, though he is beginning to feel his age.

9. Girardière, Edmond
French Assistant Administrator of Native Affairs. An intelligent and able man, with considerable administrative experience, who appears to have the interests of the natives genuinely at heart.

10. González Gordon, Pedro (Marqués de Torresoto)
Spaniard, born about 1886. Head of the sherry firm of González Byass. Very wealthy. Completely pro-British, speaks English perfectly, related to the Gilbey family. Monarchist and anti-Falange.

11. Humbert, René
French member of the Legislative Assembly, and Director of the Port Concession.

12. Jecquier, Daniel
Retired French banker, very rich. M. Jecquier has always been friendly to this consulate-general. He owns a great deal of land, and has frequently been approached by various persons for sale of land for such purposes as aerodromes and wireless stations.

13. Katzaros, John
Of Greek origin, has been naturalised as a British subject. The Katzaros family have been connected with the British Legation and subsequently with the Consulate-general for the past sixty years, and were generally thought in Tangier to be British. They talk English at home. John Katzaros is secretary to the Legislative Assembly.

14. Legrand, Lieut.-Colonel V. J.
Chief of Police. The colonel is a nominee of the Belgian Government and was accompanied by nine other Belgian police officials. He gets on well with the French, who have made much of him. He does not appear to be as alive as his subordinates are to an undercurrent of French hostility to the Belgians. He is very much influenced by his French second-in-command, Commandant Artous.

15. Lemass, Edwin
British Judge in the Mixed Tribunal. Appointed 1st November, 1949.
Born 1890. Called to the bar in Dublin 1912. Served in the army from 1914–18. From 1920–49 was employed in the Egyptian judicial service where he became a Judge of the Mixed Court in 1932. He is good-natured and easy going with plenty of common sense, but not a particularly incisive or forceful character.

16. Melenotte, Raoul
Chief engineer of the Public Works of the Zone. A pleasant type of French official. Hard working and efficient but is said to take bribes.

17. Merry, Diaz Manuel
Spanish judge of the Mixed Court, born about 1886. An able lawyer, but given to deciding cases by the light of reason rather than the rule of law. Acts as President of Appeal Court; reported to be under the influence of Catholic Church.

18. Parlare, Jaime
Spaniard, born about 1900. Educated at Stonyhurst. Originally an officer in the artillery and later in the International Gendarmerie of the International Zone. Remained in Tangier until just before end of civil war, in which he participated on the side of General Franco. Is now managing director of the local telephone company, which he runs efficiently; also engages in miscellaneous commercial transactions of a speculative kind. Affects to be pro-British, but was friendly to Axis during the war and is not to be trusted.

19. Rodière, Yves
French procureur of the Mixed Court, born in 1885. Member of French judicial service. Able and very hard-working. Has spent most of his career in Morocco. Reputed to be corruptible.

20. Tovar, Duke of, and Marqués de Gauna
Son of a former Spanish Ambassador in Rome. Lived in Tangier unmolested throughout the war in spite of his Royalist sympathies. As a grandee of Spain he has recently taken a public stand as the principal Royalist in Tangier. His royalism is probably a matter of ideology and loyalty, and, prodigiously fat as he is, he does not give the impression of a man of action. Very rich.

21. Vallet, Jean
Born 23rd May, 1885. Appointed by Vichy as French judge at Tribunal Mixte. In 1940 was head of local "Action Française en Égypte" and was at that time described as one of the most dangerous Frenchmen in Egypt. Stated on all sides to be anti-British and to have been 100 per cent. collaborationist.

22. Vredenburch, Jonkheer
Succeeded Admiral Magalhaes de Correa as Administrator of the Zone in August 1948. Formerly a member of the Netherlands Diplomatic Service, M. van Vredenburch was Directeur-Politique at The Hague before being sent on a mission to Java with the rank of Cabinet Minister early in 1948. On appointment to Tangier he resigned from the Dutch service. M. van Vredenburch is a complete contrast to his predecessor. Young—in the forties—forceful and direct, of quick intelligence and speaking excellent English and French, he at once made his presence felt in the Administration. He is now perhaps beginning to realise that direct action is not always successful in Tangier. Mme. van Vredenburch, who is his second wife, is smart and good-looking. They have three children.

23. Wauters, Alfred
Born 1912. Belgian judge of the Mixed Court appointed to replace M. de Foy. Worked with Belgian Government in United Kingdom from 1943. Was Permier Substitut du Procureur du Roi up to date of his appointment to Tangier. Has lately married an English wife.

JEWS

1. Abensur, Aaron
British subject, born about 1895. Owns, with his brother Moses (Maurice), the local banking-house of Moses Pariente, established in 1844, with which this consulate-general and the former British Legation have banked for at least sixty years. Father naturalised in 1896 by special Act of Parliament on account of the family's long services to the Crown. Of undoubted loyalty, he is always ready to help His Majesty's Consulate-General and is a very sound and reliable banker.

2. Alster, Jakob
Banker. Polish born, 30th December, 1901. Has very bad reputation but is generally regarded as most able business man in Tangier.

3. Bendrao Ruah, Isaac
Born Tangier, 26th December, 1900. Said to be richest man in Tangier, very friendly with the more influential section of the Spanish colony and claims to be a close personal friend of General Varela.

4. Bengualid, Semtob
Moroccan subject, born about 1880. Local head of the firm of Isaac and Joseph Cohen, the principal importers of British goods. Slightly in difficulties of late. Hard worker and highly respected. Jewish member of the Legislative Assembly of the International Zone.

5. Hassan, Joseph
Portuguese subject, born about 1880. Very rich. Head of the Hassan family, who own the Salvador Hassan Bank. Bank's Tetuan agency acted as Franco's bankers in the civil war, other banks in the Spanish Zone being either foreign and non-interventionist or else controlled by Republican Madrid.

6. Salama Benatar, Isaac and Samuel
Have made a vast fortune during the war. Financial activities not above suspicion, but have never been black-listed.

MOSLEMS

1. Si Ahmed ben Hajj Majammad Tazi
The Sultan's representative or Mendoub. Born in 1901. Fought on Abdelkrim's side in the Riff campaign, 1926. Appointed Governor of Tangier prison, 1928. Later held post of Second Khalifa to his father the late Mendoub until both were expelled in 1941. While in Rabat was Directeur de Ravitaillement. Returned with Mendoub on 11th October, 1945. More or less ran the Mendoub until latter's death in February 1948, since when he has been acting in his place. Si Ahmed Tazi is intelligent, speaks good French and plays the French game assiduously. He has inherited a large fortune from his father and is almost certainly not above grinding the faces of the faithful. For two years after his father's death the Sultan refused to appoint him Mendoub in spite of pressure from the French and he continued to do the work of the post as First Khalifa. His appointment in February 1950 caused him great pleasure. His outlook is very conservative like that of most rich Moors, but he is shrewd and hard-working and probably as good a man as could be found for the post.

2. Si Mohammed ben Abderrahman Saidi
The Mendoub's Acting First Khalifa. Born about 1896. Native of Tangier. Son-in-law of Si Kaddor ben Ghabrit, the Sultan's "chef du protocole" in Paris. Has held minor posts at Mogador, Meknes and Rabat. Appointed to present position on 11th October, 1945. Modest, unassuming and friendly.

3. Si Mohammed Guennoun
Mendoub's Third Khalifa, born about 1908 in Fez but lived mostly in Tangier. Was Cadi's Khalifa before 1939, later notary. Has better reputation than Nos. 1 and 2. Is brother of No. 12.

4. Si Mohammed ben Driss ben Rahmoun
Kadi of Tangier. Born 1876 but does not look his age. Native of Fez. Formerly scribe at court of the Sultan Moulay Abdelaziz. Present at Paris and Madrid conferences on Tangier. Held post of Kadi at Mogador. Appointed to Tangier on re-establishment of International régime. Has bad reputation, reported to insist on bribes before signing documents or giving judgment. Professes to be a friend of England.

5. Moulay Ahmed el-Amrani
Mohtassib of Tangier, appointed 11th October, 1945. Born in 1871. Native of Fez. After learning trade of carpenter, became successively scribe to Mohtassib, Khalifa to Mohtassib and finally Mohtassib.

6. Si Abdessalam Sheba
Born in 1881. Member of good old Tangier family. Holds post of "Bou Mouarit" (Curateur des Successions vacantes) and is also member of the Legislative Assembly. At the request of Mendoub remained in Tangier during Spanish occupation to help with supply questions. Dependable and friendly.

7. Moulay Ahmed ben Hajj Abdessalam el-Wazzani
Born in 1876. Son of well-known Shereef of Wazzan. Was Pasha of Wazzan, now retired.

8. Sidi Ahmed ben Sidi Mohammed ben Siddiq el-Ghomari
Born in 1901. Chief of the Derkaoua Fraternity, with some 400 followers in Tangier and others in surrounding tribes. Studied at Al-Azhar University, Cairo, and is anxious to return to Egypt. Clever and untrustworthy, ready to work for highest bidder. A source of worry and fear to the French authorities. Organiser of demonstration involving procession of some 3,000 natives through streets in 1947. In February 1950 he was accused by the Spaniards of organising armed incursions into the Spanish Zone. Rather than hand him over to the Spanish authorities the International Administration instituted an enquiry as a result of which he was arrested and confessed to having arranged the smuggling of arms across the frontier, but claimed that he had acted at the request of the Spanish authorities. It seems likely that in fact he was the victim of *agents provocateurs*. He was condemned to three and a half years' imprisonment and sent to serve his sentence in the French Zone where it is thought likely that the penalty will eventually be commuted by the Sultan to one of *résidence forcée*.

9. Si Abderrahman Menebhi
Son of the late Sir Mehdi-el-Menebhi, G.C.M.G., and brother-in-law of the Pasha of Marrakesh, El Glaoui. Enjoys a certain prestige as the son of his father, but not very reliable or of strong character. Is under French influence.

10. Sidi Mohammed al-Mekki Nasiri
Born about 1907, formerly resident in Tetuan. Founder and leader of Moroccan Unity Party, editor of party's newspapers (*Al-Wahdah al-Maghribia*, suppressed by Spanish authorities, Tetuan; *La Voix du Maroc*, in 1947 by Committee of Control, Tangier). Founder and director of Moulay al-Mahdi Institute, Tetuan, with branch in Tangier. Studied in Cairo 1927–31 and revisited Egypt 1937–38 (where he still has good contacts) to found Beit-al-Maghrib. Probably more moderate Nationalist than some of his followers; professes admiration for Great Britain and United States, inclined to be wordy; an intellectual rather than a leader. Has recently started Arabic language daily newspaper which so far is non-political.

11. Si Abdullah Guennoun
Born about 1909. Taught in Franco-Arab school, left in order to start a "free" (*i.e.*, not officially controlled) school 1937. New school built by public subscription and opened 1947. French and Spaniards have both sought his allegiance, but he is reputed to be non-political. In any case, the French are much less suspicious of his activities than they are of Nasiri's.

12. Si Ahmed Erkaina
Born about 1907. Owns large bakery. Probably most intelligent and outspoken of six Moorish members of Legislative Assembly. Appointed Nadir del Habus on the death of his brother Mohamed.

13. Abd-el-Khalek Torres
Leader of the (Spanish Zone) Nationalist "Reform" Party. At present exiled in Tangier, and seems to be keeping quiet politically.

14. Si Allal el-Fassi
Leader of the (French Zone) "Democratic Independence" Party. Also exiled in Tangier and quiet.

15. Allal ben Abou
Spanish subject and at one time proposed for the post of Grand Vizier in Spanish Morocco. Is a very rich proprietor and is regarded as the chief of the pro-Spanish Moors.

16. Ahmed Said
The Tangier representative of the Khalifa. Administers the Khalifa's property and business interests in the International Zone.

17. Abdelkader ben Omar Barrada
One of the richest merchants in Tangier. Native of Fez. Was blacklisted during the war, but always kept up friendly relations with the French Consulate by whom he appears to be treated with considerable respect, in spite of the fact that he has acquired Spanish nationality.

Obituary

Betanzos, Reverend Father Antonio.
Si Mohammed Erkaina.
Si Abdelkrim Erkiaouak.

JM 1902/1 No. 18

TANGIER: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS

Consul-General Sterling to Mr. Younger. (Received 30th June)

(No. 84. Confidential) *Tangier,*
Sir, *23rd June,* 1950.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith my annual report on the heads of missions at Tangier for the year 1950.

I have, &c.
C. N. STIRLING.

Enclosure in No. 18

Heads of Foreign Missions at Tangier, 1948

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports)

Belgium

M. de Radiguès de Chennevière (arrived 19th February, 1945), Consul-General with the personal rank of Minister.

*M. de Radiguès was counsellor in Paris at the outbreak of war and subsequently passed some time in a concentration camp. He is industrious and painstaking and enjoys preparing memoranda for the Committee of Control. As he is also able he is a very useful colleague. He has a pleasant if slightly malicious sense of humour. Both he and his wife, by whom he has three children, are socially minded and most friendly and pleasant colleagues. They both speak good English. M. de Radiguès has other grown-up children in Belgium by his first wife. (Written in 1947.)

France

M. de Beauverger was transferred to Havana in February, and was succeeded by M. François de Panafieu (arrived 17th March, 1950), Consul-General with the personal rank of Minister.

M. de Panafieu is 47 years of age and joined the French Diplomatic Service in 1929. He served for a time in the Secretariat of the League of Nations. When France collapsed in 1940 he was in the French Embassy in Washington and after hesitating for some time he resigned and joined the Free French Forces afterwards serving on the staff in North Africa. Since the war he has been successively Counsellor at Copenhagen, Consul-General at Hamburg and Directeur des Accords Techniques at the Quai d'Orsay. He has not been long in Tangier having returned to France twice since his arrival to deal with outstanding questions connected with his former department; but he shows himself to be friendly, agreeable and extremely competent. He is a man of the world with varied interests, and he and his wife, who is quiet, amiable and intelligent, have considerable private means and entertain well.

Italy

M. Corrado Baldoni (arrived 12th October, 1948), Consul-General with the personal rank of Minister.

*M. Caruso left Tangier in August to take up a post in the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and was replaced by M. Baldoni who had been "chef de personnel." M. Baldoni gives the impression of being more intelligent and less excitable than his predecessor and is likely to be an abler and more distinguished representative of his country. Mme. Baldoni's father was, I understand, a high official at the Italian court. She speaks some English.

M. Baldoni enjoys rather poor health and is not inclined to throw his weight about. Nevertheless, he pleads Italian interests ably on occasion and his country's position here certainly does not suffer from the fact that he has earned the reputation of a quiet, likeable and co-operative colleague. (Written in 1949.)

Netherlands

M. Paul Staal retired on 1st February and was succeeded by M. Allard Merens (arrived 1st February, 1950), Consul-General with the personal rank of Minister.

M. Merens has spent much of his service in South Africa and India, where he was Netherlands representative at Delhi during the war. From 1945–49 he was Minister at Prague, and I understand that towards the end of his appointment he had some difficulties with the Czechoslovak authorities. He may be a litle rigid, like so many of his countrymen in dealing with those of whom he disapproves, but he is personally most friendly and agreeable and, again like many of his countrymen, thoroughly loyal and co-operative. He and his wife are still at a hotel and confess that the Dutch are never happy without a house of their own.

Portugal

M. José Luiz Archer (arrived 11th October, 1947), Consul-General with the personal rank of Minister.

*M. da Cunha having been recalled to a post of Under-Secretary in Lisbon, he was replaced by M. Archer who had previously served in Vigo, Rio de Janeiro, and latterly in Lisbon. M. Archer is quick and energetic and has made an efficient president of the Committee of Control in the absences of the Dutch Consul-General. He is extremely pleased with himself and, though personally friendly, does not disguise his distrust of parliamentary governments and of democratic régimes. He speaks fair English. Mme. Archer is a pleasant if rather dull and lazy creature. They have two married children (though he must be under 50) and a younger girl here.

M. Archer was President of the Committee of Control in 1949 and filled the post very successfully. Although on account of his Government's special relations with Spain he is inclined to be more indulgent to Spanish interests and Spanish manœuvres here than most of his colleagues, he was wise enough not to show any favouritism beyond what might be implied by an extreme ingenuity in devising compromises and shelving awkward questions.

Spain

Señor Don Cristóbal del Castillo (arrived 10th September, 1945), Cons"l-General with the personal rank of Minister.

*Señor del Castillo joined the Spanish diplomatic service in 1917. He was Minister-Counsellor in Paris before the war and Minister in Athens before serving here as Consul-General from 1942–44 when he was appointed assistant Under-Secretary in Madrid. After the Paris Conference in 1945 he was re-appointed Consul-General in Tangier. During the war he gave the impression of being anti-British, but on his return evidently felt it desirable to disguise these feelings and he frequently spoke to me of the need for co-operation between Spain and the United Kingdom and the United States. He appeared to feel acutely the difficulty of his position as representative of a country which had been forced to relinquish her illegal occupation of Tangier, but still considered herself to have the strongest claims to predominance here. He, therefore, kept to himself as much as possible and tried to prevent repercussions in Tangier of Spanish political problems and apart from making long statements whenever he felt it necessary to place Spanish claims on record, he seemed anxious to avoid causing serious difficulties on the Committee of Control. During the last few months, however, M. del Castillo's attitude has changed for the worse and he has become extremely active in pressing for the restoration of Spain's former position in the International Administration. He evidently has considerable pull in Madrid and has worked hard to encourage the build-up of Spain's position here. He gives the impression of wishing to go down to history as the man who gave Spain a pre-eminent position in Tangier. The somewhat totalitarian methods which he now tends to employ make him an uncomfortable colleague on the Committee of Control. There is no doubt that he is able and cunning as well as ambitious. His wife, who is a charming little lady from Bilbao, speaks English. They have one son. (Written in 1948.)

He suffers from a liver complaint and is often unable to attend to business.

United States

Mr. Edwin A. Plitt (arrived 22nd August, 1947), diplomatic agent and Consul-General.

*Mr. Plitt was born in 1891. He began life as an engineer and after the Great War joined the foreign service, being posted to Sofia, Constantinople, Athens and Paris, where he was in 1939. When relations were broken off with Germany Mr. Plitt returned to Washington and later became Chief of War Problems Division in the State Department. In 1945 he was appointed counsellor in Berne. Mr. Plitt is a friendly, pleasant little man and although rather conceited he is an excellent colleague. He is also much more tactful with the French than his predecessor and relations between the American Legation and the French officials are much improved in spite of continuing French suspicion of American ambitions in Morocco. Mr. Plitt is rather serious minded and appears to be a sincere believer in Anglo-American co-operation and in democratic traditions. His wife, who is French, is very young-looking for her age and also very friendly. They have one boy of about 20.

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